FT-PAS-A framework for pattern specific fault-tolerance in parallel programming by Jakadeesan, Gopinatha







Computer Science and Software Engineering 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Computer Science at 
Concordia University 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
April 2009 
© Gopinatha Jakadeesan, 2009 
1*1 Library and Archives Canada 
Published Heritage 
Branch 
395 Wellington Street 





Patrimoine de I'edition 
395, rue Wellington 
OttawaONK1A0N4 
Canada 
Your file Votre reference 
ISBN: 978-0-494-63279-6 
Our file Notre r6f6rence 
ISBN: 978-0-494-63279-6 
NOTICE: AVIS: 
The author has granted a non-
exclusive license allowing Library and 
Archives Canada to reproduce, 
publish, archive, preserve, conserve, 
communicate to the public by 
telecommunication or on the Internet, 
loan, distribute and sell theses 
worldwide, for commercial or non-
commercial purposes, in microform, 
paper, electronic and/or any other 
formats. 
The author retains copyright 
ownership and moral rights in this 
thesis. Neither the thesis nor 
substantial extracts from it may be 
printed or otherwise reproduced 
without the author's permission. 
L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive 
permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives 
Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, 
sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public 
par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, 
distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le 
monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur 
support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou 
autres formats. 
L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur 
et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni 
la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci 
ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement 
reproduits sans son autorisation. 
In compliance with the Canadian 
Privacy Act some supporting forms 
may have been removed from this 
thesis. 
While these forms may be included 
in the document page count, their 
removal does not represent any loss 
of content from the thesis. 
Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la 
protection de la vie privee, quelques 
formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de 
cette these. 
Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans 
la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu 
manquant. 
• • I 
Canada 
Abstract 
FT-PAS - A Framework for Pattern Specific Fault-Tolerance in Parallel 
Programming 
Gopinatha Jakadeesan 
Fault-tolerance is an important requirement for long running parallel applications. Many 
approaches are discussed in various literatures about providing fault-tolerance for parallel 
systems. Most of them exhibit one or more of these shortcomings in delivering fault-
tolerance: non-specific solution (i.e., the fault-tolerance solution is general), no 
separation-of-concern (i.e., the application developer's involvement in implementing the 
fault tolerance is significant) and limited to inbuilt fault-tolerance solution. In this thesis, 
we propose a different approach to deliver fault-tolerance to the parallel programs using 
a-priori knowledge about their patterns. Our approach is based on the observation that 
different patterns require different fault-tolerance techniques (specificity). Consequently, 
we have contributed by classifying patterns into sub-patterns based on fault-tolerance 
strategies. Moreover, the core functionalities of these fault-tolerance strategies can be 
abstracted and pre-implemented generically, independent of a specific application. Thus, 
the pre-packaged solution separates their implementation details from the application 
developer (separation-of-concern). One such fault-tolerance model is designed and 
implemented here to demonstrate our idea. The Fault-Tolerant Parallel Architectural 
Skeleton (FT-PAS) model implements various fault-tolerance protocols targeted for a 
collection of (frequently used) patterns in parallel-programming. Fault-tolerance protocol 
iii 
extension is another important contribution of this research. The FT-PAS model provides 
a set of basic building blocks as part of protocol extension in order to build new fault-
tolerance protocols as needed for available patterns. Finally, the usages of the model from 
the perspective of two user categories (i.e., an application developer and a protocol 
designer) are illustrated through examples. 
IV 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to express my special thanks to my supervisor Dr. Dhrubajyoti Goswami for 
all his support, guidance, and encouragement. His valuable suggestions, feedbacks and 
continuous evaluation throughout the course of this research, especially during difficult 
times, helped me greatly to progress with my work. I am thankful for his advice and the 
precious time he spent helping me amidst his tight schedule; without him this thesis 
would not have been completed. 
My special thanks to my parents for their love and advice, continuous support and 
encouragement. I am grateful to them for their blessings and all they have given me 
throughout my life. 
I would like to thank my family members, friends and colleagues for their help and 
support. 
Thanks also to alma maters and all the staff at Concordia University and everyone who 
helped me in any way. 
Finally, I am grateful to The Almighty for His blessings. 
v 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ix 
List of Tables xi 
1 Introduction 1 
1.1 The Problem 1 
1.2 Objective 3 
1.3 Contribution 4 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 5 
2 Background and Related Works 7 
2.1 Various Fault-Tolerance Techniques 7 
2.1.1 Replication Mechanism 8 
2.1.2 Checkpoint Mechanism 9 
2.1.3 Logging Mechanism 14 
2.2 Fault-Tolerance in Parallel Systems 15 
2.2.1 FT-MPI 16 
2.2.2 MPICH-V 16 
2.2.3 Charm++ 17 
2.3 Fault-Tolerance in Pattern-Based Parallel Systems 17 
2.3.1 Muskel 18 
2.3.2 Persistent Fault-Tolerance for the Divide-and-Conquer Application 19 
2.3.3 MPI Farm Library 20 
2.3.4 CoHNOW-FT-DR 20 
vi 
3 Pattern-Specific Fault-Tolerance 22 
3.1 Pattern-Specific Fault-Tolerance Classification 22 
3.1.1 Task Farm Pattern 23 
3.1.2 Master-Slave Pattern 29 
3.2 Protocol Discussion 33 
3.2.1 Checkpoint Gradient 33 
3.2.2 Checkpoint Dependency Graph 34 
3.2.3 Gradient-based Checkpoint Protocol 35 
3.2.4 Extended Protocol: Color-based Checkpoint Protocol 39 
4 Introduction to FT-PAS 45 
4.1 PAS Overview 45 
4.2 User Categories and their Roles 48 
4.3 Introduction to the FT-PAS Model 49 
4.3.1 Overview 50 
4.3.2 Specificity 51 
4.3.3 Separation of Concern 52 
4.3.4 Protocol Extension 53 
4.3.5 Generic Group Definition 54 
5 FT-PAS Design, Usage and Case Study 56 
5.1 Framework Architecture 56 
5.1.1 The FT-PAS Architecture 57 
5.1.2 Framework Assumption 59 
5.2 Design of the Framework Internals 60 
vii 
5.3 Protocol Extension: Primitives, Usages and Case Studies 70 
5.3.1 Overview of the Protocol Extension 70 
5.3.2 Primitives for the Protocol Extension 72 
5.3.3 Framework Usages and Case Studies 78 
6 Evaluation 90 
6.1 Environment 90 
6.2 Experiences on the Framework Usages 91 
6.3 Experimentation and Results 92 
6.3.1 Framework Overhead 93 
6.3.1 Comparison of the Different Fault-Tolerance Protocols 95 
7 Conclusion and Future Research 99 
Bibliography 101 
Vlll 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Message types 10 
Figure 2: Pattern-specific fault tolerance classification 23 
Figure 3: Minimal state retention in a task-farm pattern 29 
Figure 4: Gradient-based checkpoint protocol 36 
Figure 5: Color-based checkpoint protocol 41 
Figure 6: PAS skeleton 46 
Figure 7: FT-PAS skeleton and its phases 49 
Figure 8: FT-PAS skeleton and its components 51 
Figure 9: Example of generic group mapping 55 
Figure 10: General view of the framework 57 
Figure 11: Architecture of the FT-PAS framework 58 
Figure 12: High-level view of the framework 58 
Figure 13: Conceptual view of the fault-tolerant parallel architectural skeleton 59 
Figure 14: Framework internals 60 
Figure 15: Failure detection monitor - post detection procedure 63 
Figure 16: Interaction between dependency analyzer and other components 65 
Figure 17: Three phase consistent checkpoint coordination 67 
Figure 18: Recovery module and its action 69 
Figure 19: High-level class diagram of gradient-based checkpoint protocol extension... 79 
Figure 20: Gradient-based checkpoint protocol - protocol behavior 80 
Figure 21: Gradient-based checkpoint protocol - failure reactor 80 
ix 
Figure 22: Gradient-based checkpoint protocol - marshaller 81 
Figure 23: Gradient-based checkpoint protocol class 82 
Figure 24: Gradient-based checkpoint protocol - service registration 83 
Figure 25: Gradient-based checkpoint protocol - application developer's perspective.... 84 
Figure 26: High-level class diagram - fault-tolerance protocol for iterative problem 85 
Figure 27: Abstractlterator and State interfaces 86 
Figure 28: Iteration-based application level checkpoint protocol class 87 
Figure 29: Iterator with fault-tolerance actions 88 
Figure 30: Fault-tolerant iterative application - application developer's perspective 89 
Figure 31: Overhead due to logging 94 
Figure 32: Overhead due to checkpointing 95 
Figure 33: Fault tolerance overhead percent - varying message localization density 96 
Figure 34: Overhead ratio - varying message localization density 97 
Figure 35: Overhead comparison - application-level and system-level checkpoint 98 
x 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Overhead incurred with and without the simple logging protocol 93 
Table 2: Overhead incurred with and without checkpointing 94 
Table 3: Fault tolerance overhead - varying message localization density 96 




In this chapter, we describe our research objective and summarize what is achieved. 
1.1 The Problem 
The advancements in computer hardware and high-speed networks have revolutionized 
the concept of building powerful clusters using networks of workstations. The 
networked-workstation clusters are more popular and used as a common environment for 
parallel-computing. This is due to their cost-performance benefit, and their suitability for 
solving a vast range of computational intensive problems using their combined 
computing powers. This is in contrary to the high priced sophisticated parallel-computing 
environment which is made from special parallel computers. 
This paradigm shift towards the networked-workstation cluster has triggered interesting 
challenges for researchers in various aspects. One such problem with the use of the 
networked-workstation cluster is lack of reliability as this is made from off-the-shelf 
components. 
Fault-tolerance is essential for a long running parallel application in order to avoid 
computational wastage. It must be noted that achieving fault-tolerance in parallel 
application is complex. There are various reasons and challenges for the previously 
mentioned difficulty in achieving fault-tolerance in parallel applications. 
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• There is no clear standard defined regarding fault-tolerance support in the parallel 
programming environment. For example, in the message-passing parallel 
programming environment, the Message Passing Interface (MPI) standard [46] 
defines some general error handling mechanism intended mainly for resource 
clean-up action, rather than from the perspective to support fault-tolerance. 
• In most of the existing MPI parallel-programming environments (e.g., LAM-MPI 
[4], MPICH-V [5] etc), the solution to tolerate fault is addressed in general and is 
not specific to a problem category. Such a solution can lead to a performance 
problem. 
• Addressing fault-tolerance issues in specific at the application development phase 
is tedious. The parallel-programming environment such as FT-MPI [1] requires 
significant effort from an application developer to achieve fault-tolerance in a 
given parallel program. It deviates the application developer's objective from the 
application development. 
• Moreover, the fault-tolerant solution provided in the existing system (such as 
MPICH-V [5], etc.) is fixed and rigid. Such solution experiences closeness issues, 
i.e., a given application is constrained to use the fault-tolerant strategy that is 
provided within. Hence, it is not possible to build and add a new fault-tolerance 
protocol. 
Various researches have been conducted to resolve some of the above mentioned 
difficulties. Our research focuses on a specific approach that is based on patterns. We 
believe that patterns can indeed be used to provide fault-tolerance support for parallel 
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applications. All of these have motivated our research toward building a new model to 
address the above stated challenges. 
1.2 Objective 
Although separating fault-tolerance implementation concern is an important benefit, most 
of the existing parallel-programming system (LAM-MPI [4], etc.) leads to undesirable 
performance overhead due to its fault-tolerance solution's generic nature. Such generic 
fault-tolerance solution might fit well for certain problems but leads to bad performance 
for others. In general, most of the existing system does not support fault-tolerance in a 
problem category specific manner. Hence, it is necessary to provide such support in order 
to check undesirable performance overhead. 
There also exists an extended MPI implementation (e.g., FT-MPI [1]), which provides a 
basic facility to implement application specific fault-tolerance but at the cost of 
considerable involvement on the part of the application developer, such as saving system-
states, logging communication messages, etc. It is tedious to address such system-specific 
issues (i.e., fault-tolerance) at the application development phase. Hence, it is necessary 
to alleviate or liberate such burden during the application development phase in order to 
focus on the application development rather than on the fault-tolerance issues. 
Most of the existing systems (MPICH-V [5], Muskel [24], etc.) support a limited and 
fixed set of fault-tolerance protocols. Consequently, there is no facility provided to add 
new fault-tolerance as needed for available pattern implementation. Thus, if an 
application demands a different fault-tolerance protocol which is not supported, generally 
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the application has no alternate choice but to use what is available or to abandon the idea 
of specifically providing fault-tolerance. Such system imposes limitations and thus leads 
to undesirable performance problems for applications. Hence, it is necessary to provide 
support to build a new fault-tolerance strategy as needed. 
1.3 Contribution 
Through this research, we have contributed patterns classification based on fault-tolerant 
strategies. This classification is novel to the best of our knowledge. We have designed 
and implemented a model - the Fault-Tolerant Parallel Architectural Model (FT-PAS) -
to demonstrate and verify our concepts (separation-of-concern, protocol extension). The 
FT-PAS model contributes: (1) to assist in application-specific fault-tolerance in a 
programmer transparent/semi-transparent way, and (2) to provide a test bed in order to 
build new fault-tolerance strategies and to evaluate the performance overhead of the 
fault-tolerance strategies. 
We believe different fault-tolerant techniques are well suited for different patterns. This 
pattern-specific fault-tolerance solution indirectly contributes to overcome undesirable 
performance overhead, which is incurred when employed with a non-specific solution. In 
FT-PAS, we achieve separation-of-concern by pre-packaging pattern-specific fault-
tolerance strategy implementation in an application-independent manner. This notion 
facilitates in separating the fault-tolerance implementation issues and alleviating burden 
from the application developer. Lastly, we address the closeness issue by supporting a 
fault-tolerance protocol extension. In FT-PAS, we contribute a set of core facilities as 
building blocks in order to design and integrate a new fault-tolerance strategy for 
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available patterns. Thus, it provides greater flexibility to build new fault-tolerance 
strategy at ease, for use with available patterns. 
The FT-PAS model introduces two user categories in order to support a fault-tolerance 
protocol extension: a protocol developer (responsible for implementing the new fault-
tolerance protocol) and an application developer (responsible for using the available 
fault-tolerance protocol). 
We evaluate the model implementation from two aspects: usage and performance. The 
usage of the framework is evaluated based on the easiness of implementing various fault-
tolerance strategies. Subsequently, the performance of the framework is evaluated by 
measuring and comparing the overheads incurred from different fault-tolerance strategies. 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides background knowledge and related 
works. Chapter 3 discusses our novel classification of a few well-known patterns into 
sub-patterns based on fault-tolerance strategies. Subsequently, we discuss two protocols 
for a sub-pattern along with their correctness proof. Chapter 4 introduces our FT-PAS 
model with discussion on two user categories: the protocol developer and the application 
developer. The subsequent section discusses three important aspects which are addressed 
in the model related to fault-tolerance. Chapter 5 discusses the model architecture, design 
and usages from a two user group perspective. This chapter also includes a discussion on 
the framework internals. Then, the core facilities related to protocol extension and their 
primitives are discussed, along with case studies on several protocols and their usages. 
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Chapter 6 includes a discussion of the environment and the results that are observed from 




Background and Related Works 
In this chapter, we introduce background knowledge and related works. This chapter is 
divided into three sections. In Section 2.1, we introduce background details related to 
various fault-tolerance techniques that are practiced in general. The following section 
provides a brief review on few existing MPI-based parallel-programming environments 
that support fault-tolerance. Section 2.3 describes some of the related pattern-based 
parallel-programming works that provide fault-tolerance. 
2.1 Various Fault-Tolerance Techniques 
In this section, we discuss various fault-tolerance techniques and their background. Fault-
tolerance in a single process system is achieved by saving the current state for later 
recovery using a contemporary checkpoint/restart system implementation. Many 
checkpoint/restart libraries are available such as Libckpt [9], PSNC checkpoint library 
[10], Condor checkpoint library [11] and BLCR (Berkley Lab's Checkpoint Restart) [12]. 
These systems are different in various aspects. To mention a few: the amount of state 
saved is different, the medium of storage is different, the API is different, etc. 
Achieving fault-tolerance in a parallel-distributed system is much more complex. This is 
due to the fact that such applications involve more than one process. These processes 
communicate and exchange information in order to solve a given problem. Using the 
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checkpoint libraries (e.g., PSNC checkpoint library, Condor library) alone would not be 
sufficient in order to provide fault-tolerance. There are various mechanisms that are 
proposed in [13] to achieve fault-tolerance for such distributed systems. At a higher-level, 
they are classified into three categories: replication mechanism, checkpointing 
mechanism and logging mechanism. There are other variances of these techniques 
available. They are derived either from one or more of the above mentioned mechanisms. 
Similar fault-tolerance techniques can equally be applied to the parallel programs with 
additional emphasis on performance and scalability. 
2.1.1 Replication Mechanism 
Replication is one of the well-known techniques used to achieve fault-tolerance. As 
illustrated in [14], it can be classified into two subcategories: active replication and 
passive replication. 
In the active replication type, there exist one or more backup nodes running in parallel to 
a primary node. Each backup node receives all necessary inputs as received at the 
primary. Independently, each node computes and generates results. Consequently, all the 
nodes compare their results and take consensus regarding the correct output. They might 
as well execute the byzantine algorithm to handle byzantine faults [22]. Other than 
computation, each backup node monitors the primary node to detect failure. 
Similarly, in the passive replication type a.k.a. primary-backup technique, there are 
backup nodes. But unlike the active replication, here the backups do not compute in 
parallel to the primary node. Instead, the primary sends all the necessary application 
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states to all the backups in order to keep them up-to-date. Thus, the backups which hold 
the necessary system software and application states are ready to take over from the 
primary in case of failure. 
The replication scheme is costly as it nearly doubles the expenses without increasing the 
computational capacity [15]. Instead, it is possible to replicate the modules at a finer level 
rather than to replicate the entire machine as in [23]. This proves to be comparatively cost 
effective but at the expense of overhead due to hosting a replica in the processing node. 
2.1.2 Checkpoint Mechanism 
Checkpoint mechanism is a commonly used technique to provide fault-tolerance in the 
distributed and parallel systems. First, we discuss some general terms and definitions 
related to this mechanism, which are used in later chapters. Then, we present the 
classification of the checkpoint mechanism. 
A global state is a set of process states, which represents the snapshot of the system at an 
instance [42]. In global checkpointing, the global states are recorded periodically as a set 
of checkpoints. A checkpoint refers to a process state saved during the failure-free 
operation. There are two concepts related to consistency, each represented as a message 
type: an in-transit message and an orphan message [42, 43, 44]. 
Definition 1 An in-transit message can be defined as a message which is sent but not yet 
received in a given global state [43]. Formally, we refer a message m^/rom pt to pj as an 
in-transit message ifeia—*ejt> such that eia e bik-i; e^ e bjk. 
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Where, (i) —> denotes happened-before relation [17]. (ii) eja and ejb are the send-event and 
receive-event of the message m .^ (iii) The behavior of a process containing the events that 
occur between two checkpoints during the process execution is termed behavioral 
fragment. For example, the behavior of a process ' j ' containing the events that occur after 
the checkpoints Cjk-i but before Cjk is denoted by the behavioral fragment bjk associated 
with the checkpoint Cjk. Similarly bjk-i is the behavioral fragment corresponding to the 
checkpoint Cik-i- (iv) Cjk-i is the k-lth checkpoint at a process ' i ' and Cjk is the kth 










0 bjk-i e jb 
Cjk 
(a) In-transit Message (b) Orphan Message 
Figure 1: Message types 
Definition 2 An orphan message can be defined as a message whose receive event is 
recorded but not the send event in a given global state [43, 44]. Formally, we refer a 
message my from pi to pjas a potential orphan message if eia-^eji, such that e,a e b&; e^ c 
bjk-1. 
Where, (i) eja and ejb are the send-event and receive-event of the message mij. (ii) bjk and 
bjk-i are the behavioral fragments corresponding to the checkpoint Cik and Cjk-i 
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respectively, and (iii) c;k is the k checkpoint at the member 'i ' and Cjk-i is the k-1 
checkpoint at the member ' j ' . 
An orphan message can occur in a system during recovery upon using an inconsistent 
global snapshot. A message can be prevented from becoming orphan when both its send-
event and receive-event are placed in the same global snapshot during failure-free 
execution. 
Definition 3 A consistent cut is a set of checkpoints in which if a process's checkpoint 
state reflects a message receipt, then the checkpoint state of the corresponding sender 
reflects sending that message [13, 17J. 
In specific, the orphan messages do not exist in the consistent checkpoint [42, 43]. In case 
of the in-transit messages, they are either nonexistent or exist to be replay-able during the 
recovery operation. In addition, all the determinants of the non-deterministic events 
should be replay-able during the recovery operation. 
Definition 4 Consistent checkpoint is said to be strong if it does not contain the in-transit 
messages [42], 
As mentioned earlier, one way to handle the orphan message is to take precautionary 
measures to prevent a message from becoming orphan. Similarly, all the in-transit 
messages and the determinants [45] of the non-deterministic events (if any) should be 
recorded to help in replay during the recovery operation. 
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Checkpoint mechanisms can be classified into three subcategories: uncoordinated 
checkpointing, coordinated checkpointing and communication-induced checkpointing. 
They are discussed as follows. 
(i) Uncoordinated Checkpointing 
The uncoordinated checkpointing allows each process to decide independently when to 
take checkpoints. This protocol is also known as independent checkpointing. This 
autonomy allows processes to execute the checkpoint operation when their state 
information is small. The major drawbacks of this protocol are susceptibility to domino 
effect [45], useless checkpoints, and storage overhead due to multiple checkpoints. 
This protocol constructs and maintains a graph to identify a consistent cut during the 
recovery operation. Two such graph models are identified here: the dependency graph 
[20] and the checkpoint graph [21]. They are constructed during the failure-free 
execution based on the message-send and the message-receive. In case of failure, these 
graphs help in recovering the failed process and rolling-back the dependent processes to a 
consistent recovery line. 
(ii) Coordinated Checkpointing 
The coordinated checkpointing requires processes to collaborate in order to form a 
consistent global state. In case of failure, all the processes are rolled-back to a most 
recent checkpoint during recovery execution. They are not subject to the domino effect 
[45]; hence, the recovery procedure is simplified. It reduces storage overhead as only one 
checkpoint is maintained on the stable storage. However, such protocol may incur 
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overhead due to the coordination action. The coordination can be achieved by different 
means: blocking and non-blocking. 
A simple approach to the coordinated checkpointing is to block execution and 
communication of all the processes while executing the checkpoint protocol [16]. This 
protocol is called blocking checkpoint coordination. In the non-blocking checkpoint 
coordination, the protocol does not block the communications. Instead, the coordination 
is achieved by sending an explicit checkpoint-request message preceding the first post-
checkpoint message on each link. This way each process is forced to take a checkpoint 
upon receiving the first checkpoint-request message. A well-known example of such non-
blocking checkpoint coordination protocol is the distributed snapshot algorithm proposed 
by Chandy and Lamport [17]. 
Some protocols use marker [18] or checkpoint indices [19], which are piggybacked along 
with the post-checkpoint message in order to achieve coordination. 
(iii) Communication-Induced Checkpointing 
The communication-induced checkpointing mechanism avoids the domino effect without 
requiring the coordination action. This protocol generates two types of checkpoints: local 
and forced. Local checkpoints can be taken independently, while the forced checkpoint is 
taken to guarantee the progress of the recovery line. In specific, the forced checkpoint 
avoids creation of the useless checkpoints. Here, no explicit coordination message is 
exchanged. Instead, the coordination message is piggybacked along with the application 
13 
message. The receiver decides with the piggybacked information whether to take a forced 
checkpoint. [13] presents few other protocol variations of this technique. 
2.1.3 Logging Mechanism 
The checkpoint techniques discussed above are expensive due to various reasons: the 
process execution gets blocked, flattening the process state is time consuming and storing 
data on the stable storage is space consuming. The log-based mechanism tries to 
minimize or liberate these overheads. The log-based rollback recovery makes an explicit 
assumption based on the piecewise deterministic model [45], based on which all the non-
deterministic events can be identified and their respective determinants can be logged 
during the process execution. 
The messages contribute largely as non-deterministic events in the message passing 
system. During the failure-free execution, the determinants of such identified non-
deterministic events should be logged on to a stable storage. In case of failure, the failed 
process should be able to recover by replaying the logged determinants. 
A variant of the above procedure is possible, which can be thought of as an amendment 
with checkpoint to reduce the amount of replay to quicken the recovery. More flavors of 
the logging scheme are possible based on the place where the message logging is 
executed on either the sender-side or the receiver-side. In addition, the way a message is 
logged, i.e. synchronously or asynchronously, leads to a different variant. [13] presents a 
detailed discussion on various log-based recovery mechanisms. 
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2.2 Fault-Tolerance in Parallel Systems 
In this section, we discuss few existing parallel-programming environments which are 
based on MPI (Message Passing Interface) [46] that supports fault-tolerance. MPI is a 
specification for message passing in the parallel-programming domain. The current MPI 
specification does not address in depth fault-tolerance like the case where a process fails 
in the MPI environment. MPI provides two choices for failure handling: (1) In the default 
option, the application can abort immediately on occurrence of any failure; (2) In the 
second option, the application is provided with the flexibility to continue execution but 
with no guarantee that any communication can occur further. 
The intended purpose of the second option is to provide flexibility to the application in 
doing cleanup locally before it terminates. Hence, this might not be sufficient to 
implement the fault-tolerant techniques which are discussed in [13]. 
In spite of limitation with the current MPI specification, the different approaches to 
provide fault-tolerance in MPI programs are discussed in [2]. Each of these approaches 
has shortcomings due to its limitation to use for a specific program structures. Different 
fault-tolerance techniques are targeted for different purposes which include process fault-
tolerance as in FT-MPI [1], network failure recovery as in LA-MPI [28], message 
logging technique as in Ediga [29], checkpoint/restart technique as in Starfish [30], 
CoCheck [31], MPICH-V [5], LAM/MPI [4], Charm++ [3], etc. Few of these 
implementations which support fault-tolerance are discussed in the following sections. 
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2.2.1 FT-MPI 
FT-MPI [1] is built upon HARNESS (Heterogeneous Adaptable Reconfigurable 
Networked Systems), a fault-tolerant computing environment. The goal is to provide a 
communication library in the form of MPI-API while benefiting fault-tolerance from the 
HARNESS system. The FT-MPI implements a complete MP I-1.2 specification and some 
parts of the MPI-2. It is aimed at providing a fault-tolerant MPI implementation, which 
can survive failures. It modifies and extends the semantics of the MPI to provide various 
intermediate states to help fault recovery in FT-MPI. This way it provides ability to alter 
the internal state in order to recover from failure in applications. 
In FT-MPI, when an error state is identified with a communicator, the new communicator 
follows one of these semantics: shrink, blank, rebuild, or abort based on its failure mode. 
More information on the semantics and modes can be found in [1]. The communicator 
follows a continue/no-operation message mode in the midst of error. From the usage 
point of view, the fault-tolerance can be achieved by making the error check and 
corrective action from the implementation effort. 
2.2.2 MPICH-V 
MPICH-V [5] is a research effort to provide multiple fault-tolerance protocols on the 
MPICH implementation. It provides automatic fault-tolerance without altering the 
application. It uses a mix of checkpointing in conjunction with message logging to save 
the process state and to automatically recover the failed processes. It introduces the use of 
checkpoint servers, dispatchers and event loggers, which assist in alleviating the fault-
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tolerance overhead. The different versions of the MPICH-V implementation support 
different protocol types. MPICH-V provides flexibility to the end-user in choosing a 
required protocol during installation. 
2.2.3 Charm++ 
Charm++ [3] is an object-model based approach to the parallel application design and 
development. It is based on C++. Processor virtualization is one of the core techniques 
used. It aims at improving the performance of the application, the productivity of the 
programmer and the scalability. Moreover, an 'Adaptive MPF version has been 
implemented conforming to the MPI standards [46]. It provides fault-tolerance support 
through various schemes: (1) On-disk checkpoint/restart—this approach involves a 
synchronized checkpoint scheme with a centralized server to store checkpoints on 
persistent stable storage. It supports only manual restart; (2) Double-memory 
checkpoint/restart - this approach involves synchronized check-pointing to save states 
using in-memory stable storage and automatic restart; (3) Double-disk (local) 
checkpoint/restart - this approach is very similar to the previous approach except that the 
storage is on persistent local disk; and (4) Message logging schemes - this approach 
involves message logging on the in-memory scheme with automatic restart without 
requiring any checkpoint synchronization. 
2.3 Fault-Tolerance in Pattern-Based Parallel Systems 
In this section, we discuss the pattern-based parallel systems that support fault-tolerance. 
Design Patterns gained popularity in the field of object oriented design after the 
17 
publication of Design Patterns: Elements of Reusable Object-Oriented Software, the 
book authored by Gamma et. al. [32]. In subsequent years, the use of pattern has been 
explored in almost every domain. In general, design patterns are about providing 
solutions to commonly recurring problems using the knowledge gained from experience 
in software design and development. 
Patterns gained acknowledgment in parallel-programming through experimentation from 
different works over the past few years. eSkel [7] is one such early work in the form of 
algorithmic patterns introduced by Cole at the University of Edinburg from the 
algorithmic perspective. PAS (Parallel Architectural Skeleton) [8] is a novel approach 
towards patterns from the architectural/structural perspective. Each skeleton in PAS is an 
implementation model of patterns in parallel programming. They are provided with 
pattern-specific primitives, such as communication-synchronization, etc. More 
information on PAS and its background is discussed in Chapter 4. There exist various 
other parallel-programming models like Muskel [24], MPIFarm [26], etc. Some of the 
related works dealing with fault-tolerance are discussed in the following sections. 
2.3.1 Muskel 
Muskel [24] is a Java structured parallel-programming environment evolved from the 
Lithium parallel-programming environment targeted for grids. The environment provides 
run-time support for controlled quality-of-service. An application manager provided with 
the environment takes care of delivering the quality-of-service to the application. The 
same has been demonstrated using two structured patterns: the task farm and the pipeline. 
The application developer is expected to define quality-of-service in terms of contracts. 
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For example, in the task farm, the performance-contracts used include the parallelism 
degree and throughput maintenance in terms of the tasks processed per unit time. Similar 
contracts are defined for faults such as recruiting a new processing resource to substitute 
a missing one. Thus, the environment delivers quality-of-service to an application 
dynamically for the user defined contracts. 
2.3.2 Persistent Fault-Tolerance for the Divide-and-Conquer Application 
The mechanism discussed here focuses on delivering fault-tolerance to an application 
which operates based on the divide-and-conquer pattern [25]. The fault-tolerance 
mechanisms are demonstrated with Satin, a Java framework for grid-enabled divide-and-
conquer applications. In Satin, the problem decomposition by recursive division leads to 
entries in the work pool in each processor. The works are distributed across the 
processors by work stealing: an idle processor steals jobs from the work pool of the other 
processors. It is obvious that jobs that are stolen from the leaving processor lead to the 
orphan job problem. 
The system provides two fault-tolerance mechanisms to handle such fault. In the first 
mechanism, in the orphan saving technique, the orphan jobs are handled by saving them 
in-memory in an orphan table along with the results. Thus, a recovering process does a 
lookup on the orphan job table to re-use the saved results. But this mechanism does not 
support the total-loss or the suspend-resume of the application. This results in the 
proposal of a second mechanism; this strategy is similar to the orphan saving technique 
but with a minor amendment. It writes the partial results to a checkpoint file on a 
persistent storage rather than in-memory. Thus, it overcomes the shortcoming of the first 
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mechanism: tolerating the total-loss and supporting the suspend-resume of the 
application. More details on these techniques can be found in [25]. 
2.3.3 MPI Farm Library 
MPI Farm Library [26] is a parallel-programming library with higher level interfaces 
targeted for scientific application development. This library is built on top of the MPI 
implementation and runtime environment. These APIs are better adapted for problem 
implementation than that of the MPI [46]. But it supports only those applications which 
follow the task farm pattern. The task farm, a.k.a. task parallel pattern, is a well-known 
algorithmic pattern. The farm's inherent nature provides added benefit to support fault-
tolerance. Since everything is handled through the master, it becomes a natural place to 
checkpoint. This library prefers portability instead of transparency; hence, it implements 
the user-driven application-level checkpointing. On recovery from crash, the master 
replays the results of jobs which are processed earlier. Thus, it forwards only those 
pending jobs to the workers. More details on this library can be found in [26]. 
2.3.4 CoHNOW - FT-DR 
CoHNOW FT-DR stands for collection of heterogeneous network of workstations, where 
FT-DR refers to fault tolerance by means of data replication. Here, the workstations are 
organized in a hierarchical master/slave scheme. The model includes various logical and 
execution components for the overall working of the system. The fault-tolerance 
activities in the model are comprised of three different phases: startup, normal execution 
and failure recovery. In the startup phase, the activity initializes by replicating the master 
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information in a protective worker. The worker takes over in case of the master's failure. 
In the normal execution phase, it involves data replication, fault monitoring and 
detection. In case of failure, the job related to the faulty worker is reassigned to an 
available worker. It also involves fault handling of various other internal components. 
More details on this model can be found in [27]. 
All the above discussions provide background knowledge on various aspects such as 
fault-tolerance techniques in general, fault-tolerance in the parallel systems and other 
related works from the patterns perspective. The general concepts, definitions and 





As a part of this research, we first classify patterns into sub-patterns based on different 
fault-tolerant strategies, which are identified based on pattern characteristics. This 
classification is novel to the best of our knowledge. Unlike existing environments 
(MPICH-V [5], etc.), the pattern-specific fault-tolerant solution checks the performance 
overhead, which is incurred when employed with a non-specific solution. We have 
designed a model and implemented a framework following this classification to 
demonstrate our ideas. In Section 3.1, we classify patterns into sub-patterns based on the 
fault-tolerant strategies. In the following section, we discuss two fault-tolerant protocols 
along with their correctness proof. 
3.1 Pattern-Specific Fault-Tolerance Classification 
The motivation behind the following discussion is to emphasize our research hypothesis 
that different fault-tolerance techniques are applicable for different patterns in parallel-
programming. In our research, we classify a pattern into sub-patterns based on fault-
tolerant strategies. A sub-pattern is a derivative resulted from embedding a suitable fault-
tolerant strategy, which is selected based on the problem characteristics. The task farm is 
a well known pattern, where the fault-tolerant strategies are identified based on the 
computational intensity of the worker as shown in Figure 2. The fault-tolerant strategies 
are as follows: (1) Restart recovery and (2) Checkpoint recovery and its variant. 
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Similarly, in case of the master-slave pattern, fault-tolerant strategies are identified based 
on communication and synchronization characteristics as shown in Figure 2. They are as 
follows: (1) Gradient-based checkpoint recovery, (2) Color-based checkpoint recovery, 
and (3) Application-level checkpoint recovery for iterative problems. Each pattern 
classification is discussed in detail in the following section. 
BasePattern 
A 





Restart Recoverable Checkpoint Recoverable Checkpoint Recoverable 
Pipeline Pattern 












Checkpoint Color-based Checkpoint 
Single Dimension Multi Dimension . on-going work 
Figure 2: Pattern-specific fault tolerance classification 
3.1.1 Task Farm Pattern 
The task farm is a well known pattern and is used in many parallel applications. It is also 
known as dynamic replication pattern. The task farm pattern contains five key 
components: task pool, result pool, task generator, result collector and workers. 
Let X be a problem space that needs to be solved. The task generator decomposes the 
given problem space X into n independent chunks. Each independent chunk is 
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represented as Xj, and is computed at a worker. Let R(xi) be the computed sub-result for 
an independent chunk Xj. The result collector is responsible for collecting the sub-results. 
Based on the characteristics of the range of applications that make use of this pattern, the 
fault tolerance strategies for the worker can be broadly classified into: (i) restart 
recoverable and (ii) (independent) checkpoint recoverable. These strategies are based on 
the workload of the worker relative to the overall problem size. All the components need 
to be fault-tolerant via checkpointing which include a task pool, a result pool, a task 
generator and a result collector. 
(i) Checkpoint Recoverable Category 
Consider a problem space where the decomposed sub-tasks are computational intensive. 
The time taken to compute such an independent sub-task is significantly large. In such a 
scenario, re-doing a lost work from the beginning is costlier. Employing an independent 
checkpoint recovery strategy at each worker can reduce the computation loss 
significantly. This can be achieved without incurring significant overhead during the 
failure-free execution for the reasons illustrated below. 
Assume that each independent chunk in the task pool is approximately of equal size and 
all workers are approximately of equal computational capability. Let T be the time to 
compute an independent sub-task Xj without any overhead. The failure-free execution 
time for an independent sub-task can be represented as follows, where Ct is the 
checkpoint time. 
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Failure-Free Execution time Et = 
T ; without any overhead 
T + Ct ; with checkpoint overhead 
From the above expression, we can infer that the execution time for the failure-free 
execution can be approximated to T, when Ct is negligibly smaller compared to T (based 
on the assumption that each sub-task is computational-intensive). 
Let N be the total number of checkpoints, It be the checkpoint interval, n be the number 
of checkpoint taken so far and St be the computation saved as result of checkpoint 
operation. They are represented as follows. 
T 
Checkpoint interval-time It = 
N + l 
Computation saved S, = n*I t ; 1 < n < N 
Assume that a failure occurs at execution time t. The computational loss incurred using 
the checkpoint scheme in a worker can be represented as follows. 
Computational Loss L(t) = -s 
t ; 0 < t < It 
t - S, ; t > I, 
In general, if T is total time taken to compute a sub-task then t represents the computation 
lost due to failure. As we apply the checkpoint scheme, the loss incurred can be refined as 
t (when t < It); and t - St (when t > It) based on the time interval during which the failure 
occurred. 
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To summarize, the checkpoint overhead does not contribute much to the execution time 
when compared to the amount of computation it saves when employed with the 
checkpoint strategy. So, each worker can be independently checkpointed during 
computation at an arbitrary or pre-defined point based on the characteristics of the 
application. Hence, during recovery, it should be able to recover from an intermediate 
recoverable state instead of all over from the beginning. 
For example, consider a graphic rendering problem in the field of animation movie 
production. It uses a render farm, which requires enormous computational power to 
render thousands of frames. Each rendered frame is time consuming. Thus, it cannot 
compromise failure in the middle of any single frame rendering. Such applications are 
categorized as computationally intensive at each worker level. Therefore, each worker 
needs to save its intermediate state. This can be achieved as either programmer 
transparent or semi-transparent. 
(ii) Restart Recoverable Category 
On the contrary, consider a problem space where the decomposed sub-tasks are non-
computational intensive. The checkpoint strategy mentioned previously is not suitable 
due to two reasons: high checkpoint overhead and high recovery overhead. 
In such problems, we observe that the computation time of a sub-task is far less compared 
to the checkpoint time if applied. Thus, the checkpoint overhead contributes significantly 
to the execution time of the sub-task. In addition, the re-computation cost incurred due to 
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the checkpoint recovery is comparatively higher than the cost incurred when the sub-
tasks are re-computed from the beginning. This can be expressed as follows: 
1 ckpt-recover ^ 1 restart-recover 
Where, TCkpt-recover is the checkpoint recovery overhead, Trestart-recover is the recovery 
overhead by re-computing the sub-task from the beginning. TCkpt-recoveris expressed as Et + 
Rt + (T - St), and Trestart-recover is expressed as Et + T. Where, Et is the environment 
recovery time, Rt is the time to recover the system state based on the saved checkpoint 
and (T - St) is the remaining time required to finish re-computation on resumption from 
an intermediate saved state. On substitution, the above expression can be re-written as 
follows. 
R«>St 
For illustration purposes, let us assume that N and n be 1. The expression can be re-
written as follows: 
Rt>T/2 
From the above deduced expression, we observe that when Rt is greater than T/2 
(execution time), overhead incurred from the checkpoint recovery is higher than that 
incurred from re-starting the sub-task from the beginning. 
In general, the problems that fall in this category satisfy the following constraints: 
• The workload associated with a given task is so small that the overhead incurred from 
employing the checkpoint strategy is more than the task execution time. 
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• The overall problem size is so huge that a worker's failure increases the overall 
workload in each member. As a result, the time incurred to solve the overall problem 
also increases. 
For example, let us consider the problem of Mandelbrot set [6] based on relation Zn+i = 
Zn2 + C, where both Z and C are complex numbers. The overall work that needs to be 
completed is huge, whereas the individual tasks (each pixel computation) are 
comparatively small. Thus, failure during processing of an individual task can be redone 
without any significant computational time loss. However, it requires availability of the 
workers at all times in order to keep up with the expected completion time. As a result, 
the workers could be configured to be replaceable with a new worker in case of failure. 
(iii) Checkpoint Recoverable Category Variant 
As another example of the computational intensive worker that might need a different 
strategy from the previous one, let us consider a special case where tasks are partitioned 
and distributed in a single go to the individual workers. The intention is to let a worker 
compute more than one task at one go, save the partial results locally, and then send the 
final results back. Therefore, it avoids overhead due to extra communications. 
There may or may not be dependencies between the individual tasks assigned to a 
worker. In either case, there is a need to save the minimal application state as the 
intermediate state (minimal state retention) between successive processing of the tasks. 
The application-level checkpointing (saving states of application-specific variables) 
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rather than system-level checkpointing may be sufficient to recover a failed worker from 
the preceding task prior to failure (Figure 3). 
Worker i Worker i 
minimal state minimal state 
::*m]^L:itma--i^M^E- ,.«»*.«,.; fMkraci 
Figure 3: Minimal state retention in a task-farm pattern 
The previous discussion shows that the task farm pattern can be further subcategorized 
based on the fault-tolerance strategies of the workers. There is a need for an additional 
component: a failure monitor. There can be one or more of these modules based on 
implementation strategies. All the other modules including the failure monitor are 
assumed to be failure-free. 
3.1.2 Master-Slave Pattern 
The master-slave is a commonly used pattern in the parallel programming domain. Here, 
the slaves are interconnected via a fixed virtual topology (mesh, hypercube, star, etc.). 
The computational model may or may not be data parallel (e.g., slaves may be 
performing different tasks), based on the problem at hand. Here, we assume that the 
number of concurrent computational units required for computation is known at the start. 
Each task in this case is usually dependant on a subset of other tasks. These dependencies 
are resolved via explicit messages within a subgroup of slaves. We call such a subgroup 
of dependant slaves a communication subgroup, which has localized communication 
dependencies among the members. There can be more than one communication 
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subgroup. Fault-tolerance strategies can differ based on the incidence and overlap of 
these localized subgroups, as discussed in the following section. 
We can subcategorize this pattern based on the communication and synchronization 
characteristics of the slaves. At a higher level they are classified into two, i.e., slaves 
having (a) well-defined communication pattern and (b) arbitrary communication (non-
pattern). It needs no mentioning that the well-defined communication patterns will create 
localized communication subgroup(s) among slaves, while arbitrary communication 
patterns may or may not create proper communication subgroups. Hence, their fault 
tolerance strategy varies. 
(i) Well-Defined Communication Category 
There are several applications that involve well-defined communication patterns. In 
general, the problem that steps into this category meets the following constraints. 
• A set of tasks must execute at same time because they require information from other 
dependent members. 
• The communication messages are localized within a subgroup. 
• Tasks that are sub-grouped based on message localization or dependencies might be 
totally independent from tasks of other subgroups. 
In this category, each communication subgroup coordinates among its members in order 
to save checkpoint. In case of failure, all the members of the subgroup are recovered 
together from the latest consistent cut. Thus, the group checkpoint action and the failure 
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recovery action are localized within a subgroup, and do not affect other independent 
subgroups. 
The well-defined communication pattern can be further sub-classified based on 
synchronization characteristics as (a) natural synchronization and (b) guided 
synchronization. 
(a) Natural Synchronization 
Informally, a naturally synchronizing pattern is defined as a pattern that exhibits obvious 
synchronization points in their behavioral fragments in every member of a subgroup such 
that inconsistent messages are guaranteed not to exist in the global snapshot saved at that 
execution point. Thus, such patterns do not require explicit action to synchronize in order 
to save a consistent global snapshot. Formally, it is defined as follows: 
Definition 5 We refer a pattern as naturally synchronizing if Br'' is strong, i.e., send 
event es in B ' implies existence of corresponding receive event er in B'"' and vice versa. 
Where B(l'k) = \J bj(1'k), bj(1'k) is a subset of behavioral fragments (discussed previously 
in Section 2.1.2) of a member i for iteration from 1 to k. 
For example, all iterative based problems such as Jacobi, SOR fall under this category. 
Providing fault-tolerance for such problems is straightforward. As they exhibit an 
obvious synchronization point, each member in a subgroup should save its local states at 
this point to form a consistent global checkpoint. 
(b) Guided Synchronization 
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All the problems that do not exhibit obvious synchronization points are subcategorized 
under the guided synchronization pattern. Such problems exhibit a well-defined 
communication pattern with distinct communication subgroups but require explicit action 
in order to support fault-tolerance, i.e., explicit action to coordinate among the members 
of the subgroups to save a consistent cut. A suitable non-blocking coordination protocol 
can be employed using message piggy-backing based on the locality of the messages 
within the subgroups. Two such protocols related to this category are discussed in the 
following section: (1) gradient-based checkpoint protocol and (2) color-based checkpoint 
protocol. 
For example, in a specific solution to render the graphics models, two (or more) frames 
are processed concurrently: the current frame and the speculative processing of the future 
frames. Each frame is partitioned among a subgroup of slaves using sort-middle or sort-
last partitioning strategies [34]. This imposes dependencies among the members of the 
subgroups. Here, the frames are independent. The subgroups are distinct and each 
subgroup processes a single frame. The gradient-based checkpoint protocol would fit for 
such problem category. In certain applications, there exist inter-group dependencies. The 
intergroup dependencies are resolved via occasional inter-group message exchange. The 
color-based checkpoint protocol would fit well for such a problem category. 
(ii) Arbitrary Communication Category 
As an example of the arbitrary communication category, consider the problem of the 
parallel ray tracing for rendering large scenes. In a data-parallel solution, the problem is 
geometrically partitioned among the slaves. Based on the movements of the rays (decided 
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only at run-time), the slaves might require communicating with other slaves in an 
arbitrary manner. Here, though the communication is arbitrary, the interactions among 
the slaves are still among the nearest-neighbor, considering the geometric partitioning. 
Hence, they form the well-defined communication subgroups. These subgroups overlap 
and merge to create one large communication group, as discussed previously. However, 
if the partitioning is not geometric, then there is no well-defined communication 
subgroup. The parallel discrete event simulation is another application domain for 
arbitrary communications. Traditional coordinated checkpoint protocol [13] would fit 
well for such problem and uses explicit protocol messages for coordination. 
3.2 Protocol Discussion 
In this section, we present two modified protocols related to the master-slave pattern. 
First, we present some required concepts related to the protocols. Next, we discuss the 
protocols along with their correctness proof. 
3.2.1 Checkpoint Gradient 
Progressive creation of a new checkpoint leads to the displacement in the most recent 
state that a process can recover from in case of failure. Checkpoint gradient is defined as 
change in checkpoint number (i.e., checkpoint number of the sender's snapshot) relative 
to a given reference (i.e., checkpoint number of the receiver's snapshot). Here all the 
messages are assumed to be tagged with the checkpoint number to indicate the 
checkpoint snapshot from which it originated. 
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The gradient can be computed from the tagged checkpoint number of a received message 
using the receiver's checkpoint number as reference. The positive gradient is an 
indication for a potential orphan message and the negative gradient is an indication for an 
in-transit message. Thus, a received message can be detected as a potential orphan or an 
in-transit message from the checkpoint gradient computation. 
Axiom 1 A message is detected as an in-transit message when the computed checkpoint 
gradient value (using receiver's checkpoint as reference) is negative. 
Axiom 2 Similarly, a message is detected to be a potential orphan message when the 
computed checkpoint gradient value (using receiver's checkpoint as reference) is 
positive. 
3.2.2 Checkpoint Dependency Graph 
The checkpoint dependency graph is a generic model, i.e., it is common to all the 
strategies. The basic idea is borrowed from [33] and is modified to accommodate for use 
in the skeletons. For any given checkpoint and/or logging protocol, its execution results 
in a protocol-specific dependency graph. Formally, it is represented as follows: 
CDG = <C, D> 
This captures dependency relations, where C is a set of checkpoints and D is a set of 
dependency edges. Symbolically, the kth checkpoint taken at a member Pi is denoted as 
Cjk. The execution behavior of a member Pj is partitioned into fragments associated with 
each checkpoint. The behavioral fragment corresponding to the checkpoint Qk is denoted 
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by Bik. Bjk contains execution and events that occur after Qk but before (i) the creation of 
the next checkpoint or (ii) the occurrence of termination or crash. 
Here, each checkpoint Qk is represented as three-tuples to capture the information 
required for recovery. Qk = <Sik, Lik, Njk>; where Sik is the local process state of 
checkpoint Qk, Ljk is the log set in Bjk, and Nik is the sequence of determinants associated 
with Bik. Local process state Sik corresponds to the local snapshot that is saved locally in 
each member. Log set Lik corresponds to the messages logged in a particular behavioral 
fragment in each member during the fault-tolerance strategy execution. 
Definition 6 A checkpoint dependency graph is said to be proper if it satisfies the 
following criteria (i) all messages that are exchanged between two behavior fragments 
are either logged, (i.e., available in a log set) or their dependency recorded (i.e., 
available in a dependency edge set) and (ii) all the determinants of non-deterministic 
events and the program order dependencies are recorded [33]. 
3.2.3 Gradient-based Checkpoint Protocol 
The gradient-based checkpoint protocol is a modified version of a group checkpoint 
protocol [33] using the checkpoint gradient. This protocol is targeted for the master-slave 
problem category that exhibits message localization within the subgroup. However, the 
subgroup as such does not communicate (exchange messages) with the other subgroups. 
Unlike the original protocol, here the subgroups are assumed to be known from the pre-
knowledge of the pattern. 
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Definition 7 The gradient-based protocol is correct if (a) the protocol generates a 
proper checkpoint dependency graph and (b) the protocol generates consistent global 
snapshots, i.e., all the local checkpoints that form the global checkpoint snapshot are 
consistent. 
Assumption. The protocol initiator starts the checkpoint operation by taking a self-
checkpoint. The checkpoint operation always happens before a message delivery, except 
in the case of the protocol initiator. The checkpoint operation and the message delivery 
are assumed to be executed atomically, i.e., entirely or not at all. There exists one kernel 
per group or one kernel per member. The kernel replays the in-transit message when 
required; otherwise, it discards it. The subgroups are defined during design time. 
Protocol. The protocol executed per communication subgroup is as follows. 
Action for member p, before sending a message m to member py. 
Piggyback group checkpoint control message (checkpoint number) along with application message m. 
Action for an initiator on starting checkpoint protocol at periodic interval: 
curckpt = curckpt + 1 
Take a new checkpoint 
Action for member p, before delivery of received message mfrom member py. 
If message m is piggybacked with a larger checkpoint number (positive gradient) then 
curckpt = piggybacked new checkpoint number 
Take a new checkpoint 
Record checkpoint dependency with member pj with respect to new checkpoint number 
Else if message m is an in-transit message (negative gradient) then 
Log message m 
Actions for member p, during invocation of receive () call (from member p): 
if member p( is recovered and there exists replay-message related to member/?, then 
Replay message m from log 
Else Execute receive () invocation 
Figure 4: Gradient-based checkpoint protocol 
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Each communication subgroup executes the gradient-based checkpoint protocol. One 
member in each subgroup is configured as the protocol initiator. The initiator is provided 
with a logical clock or timer to trigger the protocol initiation. The checkpoint interval is 
configured during the application development for each subgroup. 
On protocol initiation, the initiator does a self checkpoint to save its own state. Then, it 
piggy-backs all the out-going messages with the control information related to the current 
checkpoint number. 
On message receive, the potential orphan and the in-transit messages are identified. A 
message originated from the previous checkpoint snapshot (i.e., control information with 
decreasing checkpoint number) is considered as an in-transit message. Whereas, a 
message with an increasing checkpoint number, when compared to that of the receiver, is 
considered as a potential orphan message. An identified in-transit message is logged 
during the failure-free execution and replayed during the recovery execution. On the 
other hand, an identified potential orphan message triggers to take a new checkpoint 
locally. 
As a part of protocol, each member should send the checkpoint dependency information 
to the kernel in order to formulate the checkpoint dependency graph. Checkpoint 
dependency graph helps in identifying a latest consistent cut for a subgroup belonging to 
a failed member. This identified consistent cut is used for recovery in case of failure. 
When a member fails during execution, the kernel identifies all its dependent members 
along with the latest consistent cut from the checkpoint dependency graph. Then, the 
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failed member is recovered and all its dependent members are roll-backed to the 
consistent cut. During the recovery execution, all the recorded in-transit messages are 
replayed before receiving any new messages. 
Axiom 3 According to the protocol's logging policy, all messages whose gradient are 
computed as negative are logged along with the checkpoint. Thus, all the in-transit 
messages are logged during the failure-free execution. 
Axiom 4 According to the protocol's checkpoint policy, all messages whose gradient are 
computed as positive lead to the creation of a new checkpoint snapshot before the actual 
delivery of the message. Thus, all the potential orphan messages are prevented from 
becoming orphan. 
Lemma 1 The gradient-based protocol is proper. 
Proof. This follows immediately from the checkpoint and logging policy of the protocol. 
The protocol either logs (in case of in-transit messages) or records the message 
dependency with respect to the associated checkpoints. Thus, the CDG is always proper; 
hence, the claim holds. 
Lemma 2 The gradient-based protocol is consistent. 
Proof. As the protocol is gradient based, it inherits the capability to detect the in-transit 
messages and the potential orphan messages implicitly based on Axiom 1 and Axiom 2. 
According to the protocol, the checkpoint gradient assists in identifying the inconsistent 
messages. All the positive-gradient messages lead to the creation of a new checkpoint as 
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per checkpoint policy (Axiom 4) and all the negative-gradient messages lead to logging 
(Axiom 3). Thus, all the potential inconsistent messages are handled during the failure-
free execution. This guarantees the consistency of the local checkpoint created by the 
protocol. A global checkpoint assembled from all the consistent local-checkpoints is 
therefore consistent and our claim holds. 
Theorem 1 The gradient-based protocol is correct. 
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 1 and 2. 
3.2.4 Extended Protocol: Color-based Checkpoint Protocol 
The color-based checkpoint protocol is similar to the group checkpoint protocol in [33]. 
This protocol is designed based on the checkpoint gradient discussed earlier along with 
minor modification to handle the inter-group message as well. It is targeted for the 
master-slave problem category, which exhibits message localization within the subgroup 
and exchanges occasional intergroup messages. Each group is assigned a distinct color. A 
member's color is a two-tuple attribute based on group-color and shade (a.k.a. checkpoint 
number). All messages are tagged with color-shade tuple, as in the sender. The color 
helps to identify the message locality, whereas the shade helps to handle the potential 
inconsistent messages (as in the previous protocol). Unlike the original protocol, here the 
subgroups are assumed to be known from the pre-knowledge of the pattern. 
CID Properties 
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(a) Consistency. The extended protocol is consistent if the protocol generates a consistent 
global snapshot, i.e., all the local checkpoints that lead to form the global checkpoint 
snapshot are consistent. 
(b) Independence. The extended protocol leads to independent recovery of a subgroup if 
the protocol liberates the inter-group dependency in order to constrain the recovery 
spread within the subgroup. 
(c) Diligence. The extended protocol is diligent if uniformly the protocol does not log the 
messages (i.e., non in-transit messages) exchanged within the same subgroup. 
Definition 8 The extended protocol is correct if (i) the protocol generates a proper 
checkpoint dependency graph and (ii) the protocol satisfies CID properties. 
Assumption. All assumption from the gradient-based protocol applies here. In addition, 
we assume that each group will be assigned a distinct color. 
Protocol. The protocol executed per communication subgroup is as follows. 
Action for an initiator on starting checkpoint protocol at periodic interval: 
curckpt = curckpt + 1 
Take a new checkpoint. 
Action for member p, before sending a message m to member pf 
Piggyback group checkpoint control message (containing checkpoint number and color) along with 
application message m. 
Action for member p, after sending a message m to member pf 
\ipj is not a member of subgroup then 
Increment send-event count with respect to p} 
End If 
Actions for member pi on receive invocation from application to receive message from member pj: 
If member p( is recovered and message exist for replay related to member pj 
40 
Replay recorded message from log related to Pj 
Else 
Execute receive action to receive message m from member pj 
End If 
Action for member p, before delivering received message mfrom member pj to application: 
If color tag from control information matches with local group color then 
If message m piggybacked with greater checkpoint number (positive gradient) then 
curckpt = piggybacked new checkpoint number 
Take a new checkpoint. 
Record checkpoint dependency with member pj with respect to new checkpoint 
Else if message m is an in-transit message (negative gradient) then 
Log message m. 
End If 
Else if message m is inter-group message then 
Log message m. 
End If 
Actions for member p, on send invocation to send a message to member py. 
If member pi is recovered and pj is not group member then 
Ignore send action. 
Else 
Execute send action to send message m to member pj 
End If 
Figure 5: Color-based checkpoint protocol 
Each communication subgroup executes the color-based checkpoint protocol. Each 
subgroup is colored distinctly. As in the previous case, one member in each subgroup is 
configured as the protocol initiator. The initiator is provided with a logical clock or timer 
to trigger the protocol initiation. Also, the checkpoint interval is configured distinctly for 
each subgroup. 
On protocol initiation, the initiator makes a self checkpoint to save its state. Then, it 
piggy-backs the control information in all the outgoing messages. The control 
information includes subgroup color and checkpoint number. 
On message receive, the inter-group and the in-transit message are identified and logged. 
The in-transit message is identified by comparing the color first, then comparing the 
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tagged checkpoint number in the control information with that of the receiver as in the 
previous protocol (negative checkpoint gradient). The inter-group message is identified 
by matching the color tag of the control information with the receiver's group color. The 
color mismatch indicates that the received message is an inter-group message. Similar to 
the previous protocol, the potential orphan message is identified by computing the 
checkpoint gradient. The positive gradient leads to creating a new checkpoint in order to 
prevent the message from becoming orphan. 
Similar to the previous case, the kernel manages the checkpoint dependency graph. Each 
member should send the checkpoint dependency information to the kernel after every 
checkpoint execution. The formulated checkpoint dependency graph helps in proper 
recovery in case of failure. 
When a member fails during execution, the kernel identifies all its dependent members 
from the checkpoint dependency graph. Then, the failed member is recovered and all its 
dependent members are rolled back to the latest consistent cut identified by the kernel 
from the graph. During the recovery execution, all the recorded in-transit and inter-group 
messages are replayed. Whereas, all the inter-group message sends are ignored until its 
recovered state is in sync with the members of the other subgroups. 
Axiom 5 According to the protocol's logging policy, all messages whose color-tags are 
different from that of the receiver's group color are logged along with the checkpoint. 
Thus, all the inter-group messages are logged during the failure-free execution. 
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Axiom 6 According to the protocol's logging policy, all messages whose color-tags are 
the same as that of the receiver's group color and whose gradient is computed as 
negative are logged along with the checkpoint. Thus, all the in-transit messages are 
logged during the failure-free execution. 
Axiom 7 According to the protocol's checkpoint policy, all messages whose color-tags 
are the same as that of the receiver's group color and whose gradient is computed as 
positive lead to the creation of a new checkpoint snapshot before the actual delivery of 
the message. Thus, all the potential orphan messages are prevented from becoming 
orphan. 
Lemma 3 The extended protocol is proper. 
Proof. As in Theorem 1, this proof is based on the checkpoint and logging policy of the 
protocol. As per the checkpoint and logging policy of the extended protocol, all the 
received messages are either logged (in case of in-transit or inter-group messages) or 
their dependency recorded with respect to the associated checkpoint. Thus, the 
checkpoint dependency graph generated by the protocol is always proper and hence, our 
claim holds. 
Lemma 4 The extended protocol satisfies CID properties. 
Proof. The protocol uses color-tag and checkpoint number as control information for its 
execution. The checkpoint gradient assists in identifying the inconsistent messages. All 
the positive-gradient messages lead to the creation of a new checkpoint, as per the 
checkpoint policy (Axiom 7) and all the negative-gradient messages lead to logging 
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(Axiom 6). Similarly, the color-tag assists in identifying the inter-group messages and as 
a result such messages are logged (Axiom 5). Thus, all the inconsistent messages are 
handled by the protocol. Therefore, all the local checkpoints created are consistent and 
hence, a global checkpoint formed from the local checkpoints is also consistent. This 
satisfies condition (a): consistency property. All the messages with different color-tags 
are considered to be the inter-group messages; as a result, they are logged (Axiom 5). 
Hence, it frees the dependency of a subgroup with the outside world. This satisfies 
condition (b): independence property. The color-tag and gradient helps in identifying the 
intra-group messages (i.e., non in-transit messages). Uniformly, such messages are not 
logged but with careful attention their dependency with associated checkpoints is 
recorded to assist in proper recovery. This thereby satisfies condition (c): diligence 
property. 
Theorem 2 The extended protocol is correct. 
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 3 and 4. 
In the above discussions, we have classified patterns and sub-patterns based on the fault-
tolerance strategy. Subsequently, we discussed two protocols related to the master-slave 
pattern. From the above discussions, we observe that different patterns require different 
fault-tolerance strategies. The same can be inferred from the evaluation of the different 
protocols presented in a later chapter. The protocols discussed here are referred in later 
chapters during the discussions on the framework usages and evaluations. 
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Chapter 4 
Introduction to FT-PAS 
In this chapter, we introduce our Fault-Tolerant Parallel Architectural Skeleton (FT-PAS) 
model. The FT-PAS Model is based on the Parallel Architectural Skeleton (PAS) model 
[8]. We start in the next section with a discussion on the PAS background. This section 
presents a brief overview related to the PAS model. Section 4.2 introduces two user 
groups and their roles in the FT-PAS model. Finally, Section 4.3 introduces the FT-PAS 
model and discusses its various aspects. 
4.1 PAS Overview 
In this section, we briefly discuss the Parallel Architectural Skeleton (PAS) model [8]. 
This system envisions the architectural/structural aspects of the pattern as skeletons. A 
skeleton in PAS is composed of structural/architectural attributes of patterns in parallel 
computing. Each skeleton in PAS is parameterized based on the pattern-specific 
structural attributes identified during the skeleton design. As an example, a task-
parallel/dynamic replication skeleton, provided by PAS, encapsulates structural aspects 
of the task-parallel pattern. The task-parallel skeleton includes communication-
synchronization primitives. Some of the parameters of the skeleton are: number of 
workers and the worker itself. These parameters are bound during the application 
development phase. 
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A PAS skeleton with unbound parameters is called an abstract skeleton. An abstract 
skeleton becomes a concrete skeleton when the parameters of the skeletons are bound to 
actual values during the application development phase. A concrete skeleton is yet to be 
filled in with the application-specific code. A concrete skeleton with the filled-in 
application-specific code results in a code-complete module or simply a module. 
For any given pattern, its corresponding abstract skeleton As in the PAS model is 
composed of the following set of attributes: 
(i) The representative of an abstract skeleton As is empty initially. When concretized 
by filling with the application-specific code, it represents the module in its action 
and interaction with other modules. 
Abstract skelton 
Concretizaton 
A\ xx. xx 
Concretizaton 
Figure 6: PAS skeleton 
(ii) The back-end of an abstract skeleton As consists of a set of abstract skeletons 
represented formally as {Asi, AS2, .... , Asn}. Each abstract skeleton in the back-
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end of As is determined during concretization of As. The skeletons contained 
inside other skeletons result in a (tree-structured) hierarchy. Consequently, each 
back-end skeleton As, becomes the child of the container skeleton As. The 
children of an abstract skeleton Asare peers of one another. 
(iii) The topology provides logical connectivity between the parent-children and 
among the peers inside the back-end. 
(iv) The internal primitives are the pattern-specific communication/synchronization 
primitives. Interactions internal to a skeleton involving the representative and the 
child modules are performed using these primitives. The internal primitives are 
the inherent properties of a skeleton. They capture the partial behavior in terms of 
the communications involved and the topology of the associated pattern. 
(v) The external primitives of a skeleton are a sub-set of primitives that is used for 
interactions with its parent and peers. 
In addition to the aforementioned skeleton parameters, there exist some pattern-specific 
parameters. For example, if a chosen pattern is Pipeline, then the number of stages is one 
parameter and the connectivity of stages is another parameter. An abstract skeleton As 
becomes Concrete skeleton Cs upon configuring these parameters with values. A concrete 
skeleton Cs leads to a code-complete module when (i) the representative of As is filled 
with the application specific code, and (ii) each child of the back-end is code-complete. 
Examples of some of the communication primitive available from the task farm skeleton 
include SendToMaster(...), ReceiveFromMaster(...), ScatterToWorker(...), 
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GatherFromWorker(...), etc. Interested readers can find the detailed description of the 
PAS model with examples in [8]. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the PAS follows a hierarchical approach for the 
application development. An application with code-complete modules inherits all of the 
above discussed attributes from the abstract skeleton. The code-complete module with no 
parents represents the root of the hierarchy. The singleton module in parallel application 
forms the leaf of the hierarchy. All other intermediate modules represent partial parallel 
applications. 
4.2 User Categories and their Roles 
FT-PAS categorizes the users of the model into two: a protocol developer and an 
application developer. From the PAS overview, we understand that the PAS too has two 
sets of users whose responsibilities are targeted towards the application related aspects. 
Whereas, here the user roles of FT-PAS are formulated towards addressing fault-
tolerance. 
The protocol developer is responsible for designing and implementing new fault-tolerant 
strategies using the basic building blocks provided from the model. The protocol 
developer is expected to have a better understanding of the fault-tolerance issues than the 
counterpart (application developer) discussed subsequently. In addition, the protocol 
developer is expected to have a good understanding of the FT-PAS model in order to 



















Figure 7: FT-PAS skeleton and its phases 
During the application development phase, the application developer chooses a required 
fault-tolerance strategy for a skeleton based on the given application characteristics. The 
selected fault-tolerant strategy is configured with the skeleton to support fault-tolerance 
of the application. The application developer is expected to have some understanding of 
the fault-tolerance issues but only from the usage perspective rather than from the 
implementation perspective. Figure 7 illustrates the user roles against the various phases 
of the skeleton during the application development in the model. 
4.3 Introduction to the FT-PAS Model 
In this section, we introduce the FT-PAS model by illustrating its concepts in an informal 
manner. Our idea is generic and can be implemented in any pattern-based parallel 
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programming model. For the purpose of discussion and to demonstrate our idea, we use 
the PAS model as a base. 
4.3.1 Overview 
In practice, patterns in parallel-programming are targeted for application developers in 
the application-related aspects. In comparison, our research focuses on assisting the 
application developer in systems-specific aspects, e.g., fault-tolerance. This research 
emphasizes the following two issues: firstly, different fault-tolerant techniques are well 
suited for different patterns in parallel programming. Secondly, patterns-specific fault-
tolerance strategies can be implemented and pre-packaged in a generic fashion, i.e., 
independent of a specific application. 
We present a new approach to provide fault-tolerance for parallel application using 
patterns. We aim to achieve three important aspects from the fault-tolerance perspective: 
(1) Specificity, (2) Separation-of-Concern and (3) Protocol Extension. All of these 
aspects are discussed in the following sections. 
The FT-PAS model is based on the PAS model. It supplements a new layer on top of the 
PAS to support pattern-specific fault tolerance. Another objective of the FT-PAS model 
is to provide necessary building blocks to build new fault-tolerance strategies as needed 
for available skeletons. As a result, it extends the users of the PAS model with new 
responsibilities related to delivering fault-tolerance. 
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4.3.2 Specificity 
Each pattern is targeted for a different problem type. Similarly, this inherent nature to 
address varying problem categories can help in addressing the system-side issues too (i.e. 
fault-tolerance). An abstract skeleton As in the PAS is defined as {Rep, BE, Topo, P^t, 
PExt}, each of which was elaborated on previously. In the FT-PAS model, we amend this 
definition by including a new parameter S related to the fault-tolerance. This new 
parameter related to the fault-tolerance strategy is to be designed, implemented and pre-
packaged along with the skeleton. So our new refined definition for the abstract skeleton 
with the appended fault-tolerance parameter in the FT-PAS model is as follows: 
As = {Rep, BE, Topo, Pint, PEXI, S} 
Here, Rep stands for the representative, BE stands for the back-end, Topo stands for the 
topology, Pint stands for the internal primitives, Pext stands for the external primitives, and 
the new parameter S stands for the fault-tolerance strategy. 
Abstract skeleton Concrete skeleton 
Fault tolerant concrete Fault-tolerant Code complete 
External skeleton module 
primitives ~~ —__ 
Figure 8: FT-PAS skeleton and its components 
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The fault-tolerance strategy S is defined as pattern-specific like other primitives of the 
skeleton. They are built using the basic building blocks and/or implementing the required 
interfaces available from the model based on the strategy requirement. The various 
internal components of the skeleton are shown in Figure 8. 
4.3.3 Separation of Concern 
In practice, the patterns are realized as a skeleton in parallel-programming by providing 
an abstraction with higher-level programming primitives and by hiding the lower-level 
issues like communication and synchronization. The PAS is one such model that 
separates the lower-level parallel programming issues from the application developer to 
ease the application development. 
In addition, in FT-PAS, we address issues concerning fault-tolerance in a pattern-specific 
manner. We separate the fault-tolerance implementation concern from the application 
developer. This is by delivering the fault-tolerance implementation pre-packaged in an 
application independent manner. During the application development phase, an 
application developer can choose a pattern along with the suitable fault-tolerance 
protocol which fits a given application. 
Thus, the model can aid the developer in choosing an appropriate skeleton (pattern-
implementation) using the catalog of skeletons. This approach provides the necessary 
separation of concern to the application developer as far as fault-tolerance is concerned. 
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4.3.4 Protocol Extension 
Protocol extension is a key requirement for any pattern-based approach. Protocol 
extension in our context refers to the fault-tolerance protocol extension, provisions for 
allowing newer fault-tolerance protocols to be integrated to an available pattern, 
whenever need arises. The FT-PAS model provides various core facilities to the protocol 
developer in order to design a new strategy. Formally, the core facilities of the model are 
represented as follows: 
Fcore = {Pb, M , F r , C s , L s , T s } 
Here, Fcore refers to the core facilities provided by the model. Pb refers to the protocol 
behavior abstraction, M refers to the marshaller abstraction, Fr refers to the fault reactor 
abstraction, Cs refers to the checkpoint service, Ls refers to the logging service and Ts 
refers to the timing service. All these core facilities are explained in detail in the next 
chapter following the discussion on the framework internals. These core facilities are 




 Jpx • fcore * * custom 
Here, Px refers to an extended protocol which is to be implemented. Fcore refers to the core 
facilities provided by the model; Fcustom refers to a set of components concretized from 
the core facilities; andy^ refers to the concretization function or action that the protocol 
developer specializes and/or overrides in order to deliver the extended protocol-specific 
functionalities. 
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It is the responsibility of a protocol developer to extend the FT-PAS model with newer 
fault-tolerance protocols for an existing skeleton. In this context, the model can also serve 
as a test-bed for evaluating newly designed fault-tolerance protocols. Protocol extension, 
its primitives and usages, are demonstrated in detail using examples in the next chapter. 
4.3.5 Generic Group Definition 
From the PAS discussion, we know that a topology is defined as part of a given skeleton. 
The base level primitives of the core facilities (discussed in the previous section) do not 
have view of the topology, which is defined at higher level. A 1-D virtual processor array 
representation is used internally in the FT-PAS model for referring to a node. For a given 
topology, the individual nodes are mapped on to the 1-D virtual processor array. This is 
similar to the virtual processor grid mapping in the extensible PAS [41]. However, we 
use the 1-D virtual processor array for our convenience. In theory, it is represented as 
follows: 
Where, M\s a mapping function that maps nodes from the topology space Tto the 1-D 
virtual processor array A. There are skeletons which require protocols to be executed in 
groups like the group checkpoint protocol. The model should provide a generic way to 
define groups in order for our base primitive to understand them irrespective of the 
topology definition. This is achieved by using the abstract group mapping function. In 
theory, a group mapping function is represented as follows: 
g<M: r^ g 
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Here, QM is an abstract group mapping function, which is concretized during the 
concretization phase. This mapping function groups the nodes from the abstract topology 
space Tto the abstract group space Q. The constituents of the group space refer to the 
members in the 1-D virtual processor array. This enables base primitives to understand 
the group definition for executing the configured protocol. 
/* group mapping function*/ 
void map_group(const Location &loc, SubGroupSet &grpSet) 
{ 
grpSet[Loc[ROW]].addMember(loc); // members of same row are mapped to a same group 
} 
/* function to retrieve group id for a given member */ 




Figure 9: Example of generic group mapping 
For example, consider a data parallel skeleton in which all members of an identical row 
should form a group. The group mapping function for such scenario is shown in Figure 9. 
In the above discussions, we have introduced the FT-PAS model and various aspects that 
are addressed in the model. The design and implementation of the FT-PAS model are 
subsequently presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
FT-PAS Design, Usage and Case Study 
In this chapter, we discuss the design and implementation of the FT-PAS model. We call 
the FT-PAS model implementation: the FT-PAS framework. Fault-tolerance protocol 
extension is an important contribution of this research. The framework provides basic 
building blocks in order to implement a new fault-tolerance protocol for available 
skeletons. We also discuss the protocol extension design along with its primitives and 
usages. In Section 5.1, the architecture of the FT-PAS framework is presented. In Section 
5.2, the high level design of the FT-PAS framework is discussed, which includes 
discussion on the framework internals. In Section 5.3, we discuss protocol extension, its 
primitives, and framework usage from a two user perspective (skeleton/protocol 
developer and application developer) along with case studies. 
5.1 Framework Architecture 
In general, a framework is an abstraction to realize specialized functionalities by using 
reusable components. The abstract components/interfaces provided with the framework 
are subsequently concretized. A framework consists of the following: 
1. A generic backbone, which aids in design, development and application execution in 
the framework defined flow of control. 
56 
Application Module Application Module Application Module 
Operating system 
Operating system Operating system 
Figure 10: General view of the framework 
2. A set of concrete components, which are reusable and commonly used in building an 
application. 
3. A set of abstract components or interfaces, which are to be specialized or overridden 
to deliver application-specific functionalities. 
By implementing the interfaces and embedding the application functionalities, a concrete 
application can be generated. 
5.1.1 The FT-PAS Architecture 
Figure 11 shows the architecture with various constituents and support layers of the FT-
PAS (Fault-Tolerant PAS) framework. We have demonstrated our idea using the PAS 
model. As discussed previously, the PAS model generically (i.e., independent of specific 
patterns and applications) defines the architecture of the patterns. The skeleton-specific 
communication and synchronization primitives form the part of the PAS model. These 
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skeleton-specific communication-primitives are defined using the support from the layer 
underneath, the message passing library. 
Application Module 
PAS 
Operating system Message Passing Library and 
Runtime 
Figure 11: Architecture of the FT-PAS framework 
The FT-PAS augments PAS with the patterns-specific fault-tolerance support. The 
application programmer adds the application-specific behaviors (i.e. code segments 
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Figure 12: High-level view of the framework 
In addition, the application developer who wants to incorporate fault-tolerance support in 
an application should choose the fault-tolerance strategy and supply the application-
58 
specific fault-tolerance strategy parameter(s). Figure 13 gives the conceptual view of the 
PAS skeleton embedded with fault-tolerance support. 
Abstract skeleton ^ j 5;>;;>0 j ] 
Skeleton concretization 
Concrete & semi-concrete fault- tolerance 
strategies 
A B Y Z fc. 
Fault-tolerance 
configuration 
Figure 13: Conceptual view of the fault-tolerant parallel architectural skeleton 
Depending on the fault-tolerance strategy at hand, the provisioning of fault-tolerance to 
an application might be developer transparent or semi-transparent, i.e., requiring some 
application-specific information. 
5.1.2 Framework Assumption 
Distributed and parallel systems experience different types of failures, such as crash 
failure, omission failure and byzantine failure, which are discussed in [22, 40]. Our 
framework is aimed at handling crash failure (process crash) and assumes fail-stop [22, 
40] of software faults, along with the following assumptions: (1) The hardware and 
operating system can survive, (2) The underlying network service can survive, (3) The 
Framework to support fault-tolerance 
Concrete skeleton with 
fault-tolerance 
Application code & Fault tolerance concretization 
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communication link is reliable, and (4) The framework itself is fault-tolerant and hence, 
can survive. 
5.2 Design of the Framework Internals 
In this section, we discuss the design of the FT-PAS framework internals. We have 
classified the constituents the framework into two categories: concrete modules and 
abstract interfaces. The abstract interfaces are those which need to be specialized in order 
to implement the fault-tolerance strategy-specific behaviors. The concrete modules are 
generic functionalities that are commonly used in most of the fault-tolerant strategies. As 
a result, these modules are provided as part of the framework internals. Figure 14 
provides the design view on the modules of the framework internals. 




Figure 14: Framework internals 
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5.2.1 Messaging Mechanism 
a) Message Passing Library 
The FT-PAS is built on top of sockets due to limitations with MPI for implementing 
fault-tolerance (discussed previously in Section 2.2). An MPI like communication library 
is built using sockets. The library provides the minimal necessary functionalities of MPI 
but with added functionalities related to the fault-tolerance support. 
The basic lower-level primitives are used to form the higher-level primitives of the FT-
PAS framework. More details on the added functionalities are discussed in the next 
section. 
b) Message Passing Library Extension 
From our discussion in Chapter 2, it is clear that provision to support fault-tolerance is 
required from the underlying system-software. As in FT-MPI [1], the FT-PAS model 
extends the message passing library with modified semantics in order to provide support 
for fault-tolerance. The extension to the message passing library is described in the 
following section. 
The communicator in our message passing library is incorporated with modified 
semantics to handle failure recovery. There are various semantics possible. These 
semantics guide different recovery strategies at a higher-level of abstraction. Our current 
implementation supports the following semantics: build, recover, and repair. The build 
mode is responsible for establishing a communication link among all processes during 
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normal execution. The repair mode is responsible for reestablishing the communication 
link to the recovered member in the healthy dependent members. Similarly, the rebuild 
mode is responsible for reestablishing the communication link to the healthy dependent 
member in the recovering failed member. 
All the above discussed modes and communication primitives are lower-level details. 
They are used for the internal working of the model and hence, are not visible at a higher 
layer. 
5.2.2 Failure Detection Module 
There exist various failure models that are discussed in [22, 40] to address different kinds 
of faults. In our model, we focus only on the fail-stop fault model, i.e. process failure. 
The communication link is assumed to be reliable. From the framework internals 
perspective, the failure detection module consists of two components: Failure Detection 
Monitor and Failure Notification Service. 
a) Failure Detection Monitor 
Each process, on successful registration, is monitored by the failure detection monitor. 
The information (hostname and processed id) required for monitoring is registered to the 
kernel as part of the framework initialization during the application startup. As mentioned 
earlier, the failure detection monitor detects only process failure. 
The failure detection monitor can detect process failure based on various approaches. In 
general, they can be classified into two. The first approach is based on the operating 
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system support [38]. It scans for process availability using simple shell-command (i.e., 
ps). This, when combined with remote-shell (RSH) or secure-shell (SSH), provides a 
simple but elegant mechanism to scan for availability of a process on a remote machine. 
The second approach is based on the pulse or heart-beat technique. This technique is used 
in most of the parallel and distributed systems for failure detection. The approach is 
based on two models: the push model (heart-beat) and pull model (are-you-alive) as 
addressed in [37]. In our framework, we currently support the first approach to scan for 
faults. The latter approach (heart-beat or pulse technique) can as well be implemented in 
our model without any impact on the application as it is purely internal to the system and 








Figure 15: Failure detection monitor - post detection procedure 
Upon receiving a failure report, the failure detection monitor checks for the reported 
failure before proceeding to the post-detection procedure. As shown in Figure 15, upon 
failure detection, it finds all the dependent members and forwards the failure report to 
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their failure notification service. Lastly, it passes a message to the recovery manager in 
order to trigger a recovery operation. 
b) Failure Notification Service 
The failure notification service receives a failure report from the failure detection 
monitor. On receiving the failure report, it marks the corresponding dependent as failed 
in order to avoid the error being cascaded further. In addition, it triggers post failure 
actions which are protocol-specific behaviors. It also sends a failure report to the failure 
detection monitor when there is failure during communication with a dependent member. 
5.2.3 Checkpoint Module 
The checkpoint module consists of three components: dependency analyzer, checkpoint 
executor and checkpoint coordinator. The dependency analyzer is responsible for 
maintaining a checkpoint dependency graph (CDG) [33] which is used during recovery. 
The checkpoint executor is responsible for the following: checkpoint initiation and 
checkpoint operation. The checkpoint coordinator is responsible for leading the 
coordination action among the dependent members as a result of checkpoint initiation. 
a) Checkpoint Dependency Analyzer 
The checkpoint dependency analyzer maintains the checkpoint dependency graph (CDG) 
(discussed previously in Section 3.2.2). The CDG is maintained per skeleton and it helps 
to track recovery dependencies among the members of the skeleton. It is common to all 
the strategies and is used during the recovery of processes. For any given checkpoint 
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and/or logging protocol, its execution results in a protocol-specific checkpoint 
dependency graph. This graph captures the dependency relations and is constructed from 
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Figure 16: Interaction between dependency analyzer and other components 
In addition, the checkpoint dependency analyzer plays the role of serving the dependency 
information related to the CDG it maintains. It provides dependency information as 
needed upon request to various components during the protocol execution. The failure 
detection monitor and checkpoint coordinator are two other components which contact 
the dependency analyzer to identify the dependent members. The recovery manager is 
another component which inquires the dependency analyzer to identify the recovery line 
a.k.a. consistent cut (discussed previously in Section 2.1.2). 
b) Checkpoint Executor 
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As mentioned earlier, the checkpoint executor is responsible for executing the checkpoint 
operation. As a result of the checkpoint operation, it stores the checkpoint file in a 
location as directed by the resource manager. It also sends the corresponding dependency 
information during the checkpoint execution to the dependency analyzer in order to keep 
the CDG up-to-date. 
c) Checkpoint Coordinator 
There are fault-tolerance strategies for some patterns that require explicit blocked 
coordination with their peers. The checkpoint coordinator is used for such cases. It does 
coordination on behalf of the protocol initiator by executing a three-phase coordination 
protocol [39]. The three-phase checkpoint protocol is as follows: In the first phase, the 
coordinator receives a checkpoint initiation request from an initiator. Consequently, it 
forwards the synchronization request to all peers of the initiator. In the second phase, 
each member acknowledges back with the ready-message. In the final phase, the 
coordinator sends the commit message to all peers to checkpoint the system state. 
In the second phase of the protocol, a ready-message is sent when a member is ready to 
participate in the coordination protocol. Otherwise, a busy-message is sent when it is 
busy waiting to communicate with its dependent. For example, assume that two members 
are supposed to communicate as per the execution order. The coordinator sends a 
synchronization request to these two members. The first member happens to receive the 
coordination signal late because it is currently blocked (waiting to receive a message 
from its counterpart), while the other member receives the coordination signal on time 
before the communication-send invocation. Here, the first member is blocked for the 
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communication to complete, whereas the second member has already sent a ready-
message back to participate in the protocol execution. In such a scenario, the kernel 
releases the second member in order for the blocked member to complete its 
communication. As a result, the blocked-member along with its counter-part progress 
forward in order to empty their communication buffer. This mechanism is similar to the 
bookmark exchange mechanism in [35]. Finally, the remaining members participate 
voluntarily in the protocol execution (when their communications are complete) by 
acknowledging back with the ready-messages. Subsequently, the coordinator initiates the 
third phase of the protocol in order to save a consistent global state. 
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Figure 17: Three phase consistent checkpoint coordination 
5.2.4 Resource Management 
The kernel manages various resources which include processes and their information, 
control message queue, and checkpoint/log file. Upon the start of an application, the 
kernel spawns a required number of processes remotely in the preconfigured list of hosts. 
Each member registers with the kernel by providing its process information as part of the 
setup procedure for purposes of failure detection and recovery. Thus, the kernel maintains 
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the process information for each member of a skeleton. We refer to this registered 
information as member information. It consists of process id, hostname, state, and 
identifier. In addition, the kernel registers one listener thread per remotely spawned 
process in order to handle control messages from the application. All received control 
messages in each listener are placed in a common synchronized queue for processing. 
The kernel organizes the checkpoint and log files related to the application in a directory 
structure. This is established using a shared Network File System (NFS), making it 
visible to all nodes. All information regarding where to store and fetch the checkpoint/log 
file are directed by the kernel to the individual processes. This is done as part of the 
initialization procedure at the application start. 
This basic file management feature can very well be extended to support sophisticated 
functionalities, e.g., checkpoint/restart fault-tolerance for OpenMPI [36], where remote 
file management is achieved. In which, the runtime system temporarily saves the 
snapshot locally. Then, it moves them to a stable storage as post-checkpoint aggregate 
operations. During the recovery execution, it preloads the checkpoint file from the stable 
storage to a node in which restoration is targeted. 
5.2.5 Recovery Module 
Upon receiving intimation from the failure detection monitor, the recovery manager 
triggers the recovery operation. The recovery operation involves collaboration with 
various components of the kernel. Recovery is executed in three stages. In the first stage, 
the recovery manager inquires the dependency analyzer to identify a recovery line from 
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the CDG. As a result, the dependency analyzer computes the recovery line with respect to 
the failed member. Both the recovery line and the dependent members list are sent back 
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Figure 18: Recovery module and its action 
In the second stage, the recovery manager restores the failed member and its recovery 
executor retrieves all resources required for the application restoration. It recovers the 
application state to an earlier saved system state. Note that the recovery executor is a 
protocol specific module which is implemented by the protocol developer to incorporate 
specific fault-tolerance behaviors. Finally, when the application is recovered, the 
recovery executor registers with the kernel before resuming the application execution. 
In the third stage, the recovery manager broadcasts the re-establishment-message to all 
the members engaged in the recovery procedure. Thus, the communication links between 
revived and healthy members are restored. Figure 18 illustrates these actions. 
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The recovery procedure can be as simple as creating a replacement member, ready to take 
over a failed process to compute a new job (e.g., restart-recovery strategy for the 
dynamic-replication skeleton). Whereas, a sophisticated mechanism might involve 
recovering a failed member to resume its execution from an intermediate checkpointed 
location (e.g. gradient-based checkpoint protocol). 
5.3 Protocol Extension: Primitives, Usages and Case Studies 
In this section, we discuss various core facilities that are used in building new fault-
tolerance protocols. The core facilities include abstract interfaces and semi-concrete 
components which facilitate the design of the protocol-specific behaviors. Subsequently, 
we discuss the primitives that are available from these core facilities. In addition, we 
show the framework usages from the perspective of a protocol developer and an 
application developer. We demonstrate how these primitives are used for the protocol 
extension to design new strategies via difficult case studies. 
5.3.1 Overview of the Protocol Extension 
Protocol extension refers to provisions for integrating new fault-tolerance protocols to an 
available pattern, whenever need arises. In this section, we discuss the core facilities and 
its interfaces which are used in the protocol development as part of the protocol 
extension. 
The framework provides the following key facilities to a protocol developer in order to 
integrate new strategies. Most of these core facilities implement part of the kernel 
functionalities and define interfaces required for the protocol-specific behavior 
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implementation. This enables capabilities to integrate the protocol-specific behaviors 
with the framework internals. The core facilities are as follows: 
(i) The failure reactor implements failure notification service as part of kernel 
functionalities and defines abstract post failure action which is to be implemented 
specifically for a protocol. As part of the failure notification service, it automatically 
triggers post failure actions which are protocol-specific. 
(ii) Checkpoint and logging services implement the checkpoint executor as part of the 
kernel functionalities. They provide built-in checkpoint and logging facilities which 
create checkpoint, generate logs, save checkpoint and log data in a stable storage (either 
locally or remotely on NFS) as directed by the resource manager. The default action(s) 
can be overwritten by the protocol developer, e.g., what information to save, for instance, 
in an application-level check-pointing or where to save the logged information for the 
purpose of performance tuning. 
(iii) The recovery handler implements the recovery executor as part of the kernel 
functionalities. It provides a default abstract recovery implementation. The protocol 
developer can define the protocol-specific recovery initialization and post-recovery 
procedures. It collaborates with the kernel in recovering both the application and the 
communication links among the members of the skeleton. 
(iv) The marshaller provides an interface for implementation of the protocol-specific data 
marshalling and un-marshalling capabilities. The framework provides a default 
marshaller that facilitates the marshalling and un-marshalling of the application's 
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contiguous data (without pointers). It can be extended to support complex non-contiguous 
data as well. The default marshaller can also be extended by the protocol developer for 
marshalling/un-marshalling of the fault-tolerance protocol-specific control information. 
(v) The fault-tolerance protocol behavior module provides an interface to the protocol 
developer in order to incorporate fault-tolerance protocol specific behavior which is 
executed as part of the protocol. For example, in case of the gradient-based checkpoint 
protocol, its behavior includes starting the checkpoint action by the protocol initiator. 
Consequently, the checkpoint action is executed in other group members after receiving a 
control message with checkpoint flag set, etc. Similarly, the handling of the in-transit 
messages (i.e., by logging/replaying during the failure-free/recovery execution) is all part 
of the protocol specific behaviors. 
5.3.2 Primitives for the Protocol Extension 
In this section, we discuss the primitives available from the various core facilities 
introduced in the previous section. 
a) Checkpoint service 
The checkpoint service implements the checkpoint facility with two flavors: system-level 
check-pointing and application-level check-pointing. The type to use for a given protocol 
is defined as part of the strategy definition by the protocol developer. 
In case of system-level checkpoint, the checkpoint service uses a customized checkpoint 
library to save the checkpoint state. This customized version is derived from a well 
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known checkpoint library [10] from the PSNC research group. The derived version has 
been tailored specifically to the needs of our framework. In case of application level 
checkpoint, it uses a simple mechanism to save the application developer's identified 
state on to the stable storage. Both implementations are wrapped around a common 
interface, though the underlying technique/mechanism involved in these two variants is 
different. Below is the list of primitives available from the checkpoint service to a 
protocol developer: 
(i) Primitive for Setup Action: This primitive is used to setup the checkpoint service in a 
skeleton. It is invoked as part of strategy initialization in the skeleton. 
(ii) Primitive for Checkpoint Action: This primitive is used to initiate the checkpoint 
action. It is invoked during the failure-free execution to save the system state that is used 
during the recovery. 
(Hi) Primitive for Recovery Action: This primitive is used to initiate the recovery action. 
It is invoked as part of the recovery execution and recovers the system state to an earlier 
saved-execution state stored during the failure-free execution. 
(iv) Primitive for Call Back Registration Action: Each strategy is unique and requires a 
way to define strategy-specific action as part of a protocol, i.e., post checkpoint action 
and post recovery action. The checkpoint service provides a callback mechanism to 
achieve this. This primitive is used by the protocol developer to register a callback 
method. It is registered either as post checkpoint action type or post recovery action type. 
The checkpoint service invokes the callback method automatically as post-failure actions 
based on callback type (defined during the service registration). 
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b) Logging service 
The logging service provides necessary basic interfaces required for the protocol 
development related to logging. The logging service is used for different purposes based 
on the fault-tolerance strategy. It is used for logging messages and for recording send 
events. In case of gradient-based checkpoint protocol, it is used to log the in-transit 
messages. Whereas, in the color-based checkpoint protocol, it is used to log messages of 
two types - in-transit messages and inter-group messages. In the traditional logging 
protocol, it is used to log all the messages exchanged among the members. The purpose 
of the logging service varies based on the fault-tolerance strategy. Below is the list of 
primitives available from the logging service to a protocol developer: 
(i) Primitive for Setup Action: This primitive is used to setup the logging service in a 
skeleton. It is executed as part of the fault-tolerance strategy initialization in the skeleton. 
It is invoked during both the normal execution and the recovery execution. 
(ii) Primitive for Cleanup Action: This primitive is used to clean up the log generated 
during the fault-tolerance strategy execution. 
(Hi) Primitive for Message Record Action: This primitive is used for logging a message. 
It is invoked as part of the fault-tolerance strategy execution. 
(iv) Primitive for Message Replay Action: This primitive is used to replay an earlier 
recorded message during the application recovery. It is a part of the recovery execution 
strategy. 
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(v) Primitive for Replay-Message Existence Check: This primitive is used to check for 
existence of a replay message. This decision is used by the protocol in order to decide for 
a message replay action. 
(vi) Primitive for Send Redundancy Check: This primitive is used to check whether a 
send-action is to be ignored or not. It returns true when the send-action is a redundant 
action. This decision is used by the protocol to ignore the send-action replay related to a 
non-dependent member which is not part of the recovery group. 
c) Marshaller service 
The marshaller service facilitates the protocol developers to incorporate 
packing/unpacking actions to embed the protocol-specific control information. This 
service provides a default packing and unpacking implementation for the application 
messages. It can be extended by a protocol developer to incorporate strategy-specific 
actions such as piggy-backing the control information with the application messages. 
Below are the data packing primitives available from the marshaller service: 
(i) Primitive for Data Packing: This primitive is used to marshal the input data into a 
specified target buffer. 
(ii) Primitive for Data Unpacking: This primitive is used to un-marshal the encoded data 
into a specified target buffer. 
Below are the marshaller interfaces which need to be concretized in order to specify 
protocol-specific actions: 
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(i) Interface for Marshal Action: This interface should be concretized to implement the 
strategy-specific marshalling actions. It is invoked on a send-action as part of the pre-
processing operation. 
(ii) Interface for UnMarshal Action: This interface should be concretized to implement 
the strategy-specific un-marshalling actions. It is invoked on a receive-action as part of 
the post-processing operation. A default marshaller implementation to pack/unpack the 
application message is shown below. 
class DefaultMarshaller: public Marshaller 
{ void marshalAction(...) /* Default marshalling procedure */ 
{ DataPacking::pack(...);/*Pack application data*/ } 
void unmarshalAction(...) /* Default un-marshalling action */ 
{ int offset = DataPacking::unpack('...); /*Unpack application data */ } 
} 
d) Failure reactor service 
The implementation of the framework provides the default failure reactor as shown 
below. 
class DefaultFailureReactor: public FailureNotificationService{ 
void actionQ 
{ 
/* Re-establishes communication link with recovered member */ 
ftCommService.ReconnectComm(....); 
}} 
Note that there can be differences in these actions, depending on the protocol. For 
example, in a color-based checkpoint protocol where the groups can exchange occasional 
messages among them, the re-establishment of the communication links can be delayed 
as some sends are discarded (redundant sends). Similarly, if receives need to replay 
logged messages then re-establishment of the communication links can be delayed. 
Hence, the framework facilitates by providing interfaces to both define and register 
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strategy-specific failure reactors for different communication methods. The Failure 
Reactor Registration Primitive is used to register a failure reactor module to the 
framework. The registered failure reactors are invoked by the failure notification service. 
They are executed as part of the pre-processing operations during recovery. 
e) Fault-tolerance behavior 
This service provides interface methods which are to be implemented to define protocol 
specific behaviors. The list of interface methods available to a protocol developer are as 
follows: (i) Pre-Send Fault-Tolerance Behavior, (ii) Post-Send Fault-Tolerance 
Behavior, (Hi) Pre-Delivery Fault-Tolerance Behavior, (iv) Post-Delivery Fault-
Tolerance Behavior, (v) Send Fault-Tolerance Behavior and (vi) Receive Fault-Tolerance 
Behavior. 
All the above interface methods should be concretized by the protocol developer to 
define pre- and post-actions related to a fault-tolerance strategy. Their uses in few of the 
strategies are shown as part of case studies in the following sections. 
f) Integration 
The protocol developer has to integrate all the protocol services used in the fault-
tolerance strategy design. A service registration method (registerFTServices) is defined 
in the protocol class to facilitate integration. The protocol developer has to implement 
this method. In this method, the protocol developer defines necessary service instances 
and invokes their corresponding service registration method to configure services. The 
framework provides one primitive for registration action for each service. These 
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primitives are listed as follows: (i) Primitive for Marshaller Registration (ii) Primitive for 
Timing Service Registration, (Hi) Primitive for Checkpoint Service Registration, (iv) 
Primitive for Logging Service Registration, (v) Primitive for Failure Reactor Registration 
and (vi) Primitive for Fault-Tolerance Behavior Registration. 
The registerFTServices method is invoked as part of the fault-tolerance strategy 
initialization. In addition, the protocol developer needs to implement protocol-specific 
cleanup action if required. Those fault-tolerance service-specific cleanups are invoked in 
the cleanupFTServices method of the protocol class. In turn, this will be invoked as part 
of the protocol cleanup action. 
5.3.3 Framework Usages and Case Studies 
In this section, we illustrate the framework usage by implementing two pattern-specific 
fault-tolerance protocols using the above discussed primitives. 
5.3.3.1 Case Study 1: Gradient-based Checkpoint Protocol 
In this section, we illustrate how to implement a variation of a group checkpoint protocol 
for the master-slave skeleton using the core facilities provided by the framework. The 
protocol implemented here is the 'gradient-based checkpoint protocol' that is discussed in 
Section 3.2. The protocol assumes that the subgroups are independent, i.e., there are no 
(occasional) interactions across subgroups. The coordination among subgroup members 
are achieved via piggybacking of application messages with control information. Thus, 
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Figure 19: High-level class diagram of gradient-based checkpoint protocol extension 
Figure 19 provides a high-level class hierarchy diagram illustrating the framework 
modules involved and their extensions by a protocol developer, which are elaborated in 
the following: 
a) Usages of the framework from a protocol developer's perspective 
The following discussion illustrates a protocol developer's involvement in implementing 
the gradient-based checkpoint protocol using the core functionalities of the framework. 
Each fault-tolerance protocol has a protocol-specific behavior class which is extended by 
the protocol developer from the default behavior class, FTBehavior. In this specific 
example, we name this extended class as GradientCkptBehavior. This extended behavior 
class implements all the protocol-specific actions as shown in the pseudo code of the 
gradient-based checkpoint protocol in Figure 20. 
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Protocol specific fault tolerant behavior for pre-send action: 
If I am the Initiator and the checkpoint flag is enabled 
Increment the checkpoint number. 
Take a new checkpoint. 
End If 
Protocol specific fault tolerant behavior for pre message-delivery action: 
If the computed checkpoint gradient is positive (i.e., piggybacked checkpoint number is large) 
Update receiver's checkpoint number with the piggybacked checkpoint number. 
Take a new checkpoint. 
Record checkpoint dependency. 
Else if the computed checkpoint gradient is negative (i.e., in-transit message) 
Record the received message. 
End If 
Protocol specific fault tolerant behavior for post receive-invocation action: 
If the member is currently recovered and there exist messages available for replay then 
Replay-message from log. 
Returns a flag to indicate the existence of the replay-message. 
Else 
Returns a flag to indicate the non-existence of the replay-message. 
End If 
Figure 20: Gradient-based checkpoint protocol - protocol behavior 
In this protocol, each member process logs the in-transit messages. During recovery, the 
revived member needs to replay these messages and hence, re-establishment of the 
communication links could be delayed. The module inherits the failure notifications 
service and implements post-recovery actions as shown in Figure 21. Such actions are 
also defined for other communication methods, e.g. send, probe, etc. 
Protocol specific failure reactor action for receive communication method: 
If replay-messages do not exist then 
Re-establish the communication link. 
End If 
Figure 21: Gradient-based checkpoint protocol - failure reactor 
Similarly, as mentioned earlier, the framework provides default data marshalling and un-
marshalling facilities. It can be extended by a protocol developer to incorporate protocol-
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specific marshalling action by implementing the Marshaller interface. In this particular 
example of the gradient checkpoint protocol, it is required to piggyback protocol-specific 
control information (i.e. checkpoint number). The pseudo-code of the protocol-specific 
GCPMarshaller action implementations are shown in Figure 22. 
Protocol specific marshal action: 
(i) Pack the application message to the target buffer using the data packing utility. 
(ii) Pack the control message to the target buffer using the data packing utility. 
Protocol specific unmarshal action: 
(i) Unpack the application message from the input buffer using the data packing utility. 
(ii) Unpack the control message from the input buffer using the data packing utility. 
Figure 22: Gradient-based checkpoint protocol - marshaller 
Now we implement the protocol class, FTPGradientbasedCkpt. This protocol class 
inherits from the FTProtocolBase class of the framework. The protocol developer 
overrides two initialization methods and provides protocol-specific initialization actions 
as shown in Figure 23. 
In the overridden startuplnitialize method, the default base protocol's initialization 
method is first invoked. This establishes the communication link from the member to the 
framework kernel. Next, the setup method for the checkpoint service is invoked to 
initialize the service. This is followed by setting up a checkpoint interval using the in-
built per-process timer service through invocation of the setTimer method. Lastly, the 
logging service setup routine is invoked to initialize the logger in order to record and 
replay the in-transit messages. 
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..../* other support method definitions */ 
}; 
public: 
/* Extension with protocol specific startup initialization */ 
void startuplnitialize() 
{ FTProtocolBase::startuplnitialize();/* Framework provided initialization */ 
getCheckpointService().setup(....);/* Checkpoint service setup */ 
getTimingService().setTimer(....);/* Timer initialization */ 
getLoggingService().setup(....);/* Logger initialization */ 
} 
/* Extension with protocol specific recovery initialization */ 
void recoveryInitialize() 
{ FTProtocolBase::recoveryInitialize(); /* Framework provided initialization*/ 
getCheckpointService().setupAction(....);/* Checkpoint service setup */ 
getCheckpointService().recoveryAction();/* Checkpoint recovery step */ 
} 
/* Extension with protocol specific post checkpoint recovery */ 
void postRecoveryCallBack() 
{ FTProtocolBase::registerInfoToKernel(); /* Register info, with kernel*/ 
FTCommService ftComm; 
ftComm.reset(); /* Reset comm. channel state */ 
getLoggingService().setupl(....); /* Setup logging service to replay messages*/ 
} 
} 
Figure 23: Gradient-based checkpoint protocol class 
Similar initializations are done during the recovery execution. They are amended in the 
recoverylnitialize method. This protocol uses the checkpoint service as part of protocol 
behavior. Hence, the protocol should implement post-recovery callback methods (Figure 
23) in order to execute the necessary protocol-specific post-recovery actions. Finally, all 
the protocol-specific service implementations are integrated using the registerFTServices 




/* Failure reactor registration */ 
registerFailureReactor(RECV_FAILUREJR£ACTOR,newGCPRecvFailureReactor()); 
..../* Similar registration of other reactor */ 
registerMarshaller(new GCPMarshaller()); /*Marshaller registration */ 
registerTimingService(new Clock()); /* Timing service registration */ 
registerLoggingService(new LoggingService()); /* Logging service registration */ 
CheckpointService ckptService = new CheckpointService(SYSTEMLEVEL); 
registerCheckpointService(ckptService); /* Checkpoint service registration */ 
/* Post checkpoint action and post recovery action registration */ 
ckptService->registerCallBack(POST_RECOVERY_ACTION, 
CheckpointService: :CallBack(this, &FTProtocolInterface::postRecoveryCallBack)); 
..../* Similar registration of postCheckpointCallBack method */ 
registerFTBehavior(new GradientCkptBehavior()); /* FT Behavior registration*/ 
} 
Figure 24: Gradient-based checkpoint protocol - service registration 
In the previous discussion, a protocol developer is assumed to be knowledgeable about 
the framework's services and its interfaces. Also, the protocol developer is required to be 
knowledgeable about the system's specific issues, e.g., fault-tolerance protocol design. 
On the contrary, an application developer is expected to be minimally knowledgeable 
about the system's specific issues. The following section illustrates an application 
developer's involvement in embedding the previous fault-tolerance protocol into an 
application code that uses the master-slave skeleton. 
b) Usages from an application developer's perspective 
In a blocking checkpoint protocol, where all processes are part of one group, the 
application developer has virtually no involvement other than choosing a checkpoint 
interval (if not using the default). In case of the previous protocol, the application 
developer has to specify the subgroups and the protocol initiator for each subgroup. 
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class Slave : public SingletonSkeleton<CommFrot MS, FTPGradientbasedCkpt> 
{ /* The Slave module extends the SingletonSkeleton in PAS. Its communication protocol is 
CommProtMS and FT protocol is FTPGradientCkpt, which is the extended FT protocol class defined in 
the previous section */ 
void run() {/* application specific code */} 
} 
class Application : public MasterSlaveSkeleton <Slave, CommProtMS, VOID, FTPGradientbasedCkpt> 
{/* An application that uses the Master-Slave skeleton */ 
void run() {/* application specific code */} 
void FTConfigure() /* FT protocol specific configuration */ 
{ SubGroups subgrpSet; /* Set of communication subgroups */ 
subgrpSet.setSize(NUM_OF_SUBGRPS); /* Specify the size */ 
/* create a subgroup: groupid, number of members, member enumeration */ 
SubGroup grpl(GRPl J D , GRP1_SIZE, GRP1_MEMBERS); 
grpl.ProtocolInitiator (GRPIJTNITIATORJD); /* set protocol initiator id */ 
grpl.Ckptlnterval = GRP1 CKPTINTERVAL; /* set checkpoint interval */ 
subgrpSet.addSubGroup (grpl); /* add the above defined subgroup to the set */ 
/* ...Other subgroup declaration are omitted... */ 
} 
U I 
Figure 25: Gradient-based checkpoint protocol - application developer's perspective 
Each instantiated FT-PAS module has a run method and an FTConfigure method for fault 
tolerance configuration. This is illustrated in Figure 25. The implementation of the 
FTConfigure method is the only involvement of the application developer from the fault-
tolerance perspective (Figure 25). For certain protocols, the configure methods can use 
the default in-built parameters and functionalities. Hence, the fault tolerance support 
becomes completely application-developer transparent in such cases. 
5.3.3.2 Case Study 2: Application-level checkpointing for Iterative Problems 
In this section, we demonstrate how to implement the fault-tolerance protocol for the 
master-slave skeleton where the slaves are naturally synchronizing, i.e., iterative in 
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Figure 26: High-level class diagram - fault-tolerance protocol for iterative problem 
It is assumed that the application developer identifies all the application state variables. 
Only these user-identified application states are saved and restored during the checkpoint 
and recovery execution. Figure 26 illustrates a high-level class diagram of the various 
classes involved in the protocol implementation. 
a) Usage of the framework from a protocol developer's perspective 
The following section illustrates a protocol developer's involvement in implementing the 
fault-tolerance protocol for the naturally synchronizing slaves. In order to support the 
application-level checkpointing, the framework provides a state class as shown in Figure 
27. In addition, the framework provides an abstract iterator as shown in Figure 27. This 
protocol implements this abstract iterator to plug-in the fault-tolerance (application-level 







template <class TState, class FT> 
class Abstractlterator : public FT 
{ virtual void Init(TState &myState)=0; 
virtual bool Check(TState &myState, bool *ret)=0; 
virtual void Finalize(TState &myState)=0; 
virtual void Iteration(TState &myState)=0; 
virtual void PostIteration(TState &myState)=0; 
virtual void Start(TState &myState)=0; 
} 
Figure 27: Abstractlterator and State interfaces 
The state class is amended with a set of minimal states which need to be saved for the 
internal working of the iterator. In the next subsection, we show how this specialized 
iterator is used by the application developer for concretization of the slave (application-
specific). 
As mentioned earlier, this protocol is targeted for problems which exhibit natural 
synchrony in their behavioral pattern (i.e., slaves which are iterative in nature). Thus, the 
protocol requires no explicit coordination action or protocol behavior and does not 
exchange any protocol-specific control information. Hence, it uses the default marshaller 
for marshalling the application messages. It uses the default failure reactor for re-
establishing the communication link. Timing service is used to trigger the checkpoint at 




/* Failure reactor registration */ 
registerFailureReactor(RECV_FAILURE_REACTOR, new DefaultFailureReactor()); 
..../* Similar registration of other reactor */ 
registerMarshaller(new DefauItMarshaller()); /*Marshaller registration */ 
CheckpointService ckptService = new CheckpointService(APPLICATIONLEVEL); 
registerCheckpointService(ckptService); /* Checkpoint service registration */ 
} 
Figure 28: Iteration-based application level checkpoint protocol class 
Similar to the protocol discussed earlier, the FTProtocolNatuSync protocol class provides 
protocol initialization actions for both the startup and recovery execution. Subsequently, 
the protocol class provides implementation to the registerFTServices method in order to 
integrate various services used in the protocol implementation (Figure 28). The 
checkpoint service instance used here is configured to support the application-level 
checkpointing. 
The FTIteratorAppLvlCkpt class implements the abstract iterator by using the fault-
tolerance protocol as the FTProtocolNatuSync protocol class. In the iterator 
implementation, the protocol developer provides implementation only for the Start and 
Postlteration methods. This is illustrated in Figure 29. 
Protocol specific start action: 
If the recovery flag set then 
Recover the application-states. 
Else 
Initialize the application-specific states. 
End If 
Loop until the exit condition defined in the check method is 
Execute the iterator method. 
End Loop 




If the iteration 
Post-Iteration action: 
count matches the checkpoint 
Takes a new checkpoint. 
End If 
iteration interval the 
Figure 29: Iterator with fault-tolerance actions 
All other method definitions (i.e., Init, Check, Iterator, Finalize) are delegated to the 
application developer in order to define the application-specific behaviors. 
b) Usages from an application developer's perspective 
The application developer's involvement in using the above designed protocol is shown 
in Figure 30. 
class AppState : public State 
{ Work work; 
Result partial Result; 
} 
class Slave : public SingletonSkeleton<CommProt_MS, FTIteratorAppLvlCkpt<AppState» 
{ /* The Slave module extends the SingletonSkeleton using CommProt_MS as communication protocol 
and FTIteratorAppLvlCkpt as FT protocol, which is an iterator implementation embedded with fault-
tolerance protocol */ 
AppState myState; /* Application state instance */ 
void Init(AppState *state){/* Application specific code */} 
void Iterator(AppState *state){/* Application specific code */} 
void Check(AppState *state){/* Application specific code */} 
void Finalize(AppState *state){/* Application specific code */} 
} 
class MSApplication : public MasterSlaveSkeleton <Slave, CommProtMS, VOID, 
FTIteratorAppLvlCkpt> 
{ /* An application that uses the Master-Slave skeleton */ 
void run() {/* application specific code */} 
void FTConfigure() 
{/* FT protocol specific configuration */ 
SubGroups subgrpSet; /* Set of communication subgroups */ 
subgrpSet.setSize(NUM_OF_SUBGRPS); /* Specify the size */ 
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/* create a subgroup: groupid, number of members, member enumeration */ 
SubGroup grpl(GRPl_ID, GRP1_SIZE, GRP1_MEMBERS); 
grpl.ProtocolInitiator (GRPl_INITIATOR_ID); /* set protocol initiator id */ 
grpl.Ckptlnterval = CKPTJTERAINTERVAL; /* set checkpoint iteration interval */ 
subgrpSet.addSubGroup (grpl); /* add the above defined subgroup to the set */ 
} 
J 
Figure 30: Fault-tolerant iterative application - application developer's perspective 
As with other protocols discussed earlier, the application developer should concretize 
FTConfigure as part of the fault-tolerance configuration. The application developer 
should define a class inheriting the state class like AppState (Figure 30). This class 
should be defined with all the application-specific state variables which need to be saved 
as part of the application-level checkpointing. In addition, the application developer 
should concretize the iterator methods inherited in the slave class with the application-
specific code. Moreover, the slave class should declare an instance of the AppState class 
and use this instance to hold any application state during processing. 
In the above discussions, we have demonstrated the framework design, its primitives and 
usages through two case studies. The evaluation of the above built pattern-specific fault-




In this chapter, we discuss the evaluation of the framework in terms of its usages and 
performance. In Section 6.1, we discuss the environment and implementation issues 
related to the FT-PAS framework. Subsequently, we summarize our experience on the 
usages of the framework and its related issues. Finally, in Section 6.3, we present the 
experimental results and discuss the performance overhead of the FT-PAS framework. 
6.1 Environment 
The current implementation of the FT-PAS framework is in C++. The test environment 
consists of Sun-Fire-280R workstations. Each workstation has 2 CPUs (UltraSPARC III 
Cu processors); it operates at 1015 MHz and has 4 GB RAM. All the workstations are 
running the Solaris 9 operating system (SunOS) and are connected by LAN. 
The framework uses a customized version of the PSNC Checkpoint library. The original 
version of the library was written in C. We ported it to C++ and customized it to the 
needs of the framework. 
The framework is currently implemented on the Solaris platform. The experiments are 
conducted in a LAN of homogeneous workstations. The development system uses 
standard tools like GNC C++ library, etc., for compilation and execution. The underlying 
communication layer uses sockets. 
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6.2 Experiences on the Framework Usages 
To evaluate the usages of the FT-PAS, we implemented a set of protocols for the master-
slave skeleton. We designed the gradient-based checkpoint protocol and the color-based 
checkpoint protocol (discussed previously in Section 3.2). We implemented both the 
protocols and tested their performance with the above discussed test environment. The 
experimental results are presented in the next section. 
Below are few observations made from the experiments conducted during our evaluation. 
• Using the FT-PAS, it is expected that the effort required to develop fault-tolerant 
parallel applications are minimized. 
o It provides built-in fault-tolerant skeletons, readily usable for application-
development with minimal effort. 
o It provides capability to choose fault-tolerance strategies based on the 
application-characteristics from a list of supported protocols for a given 
skeleton. 
• Moreover, the FT-PAS is expected to reduce the protocol development time for 
implementing new fault-tolerant strategies from the perspective of a protocol 
developer. 
o It provides concrete reusable services such as checkpoint service, logging 
service, fault monitor, etc., in order to reduce strategy implementation time. 
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o It provides semi-concrete or abstract interfaces to incorporate strategy-specific 
behavior. 
• The FT-PAS objective is to achieve a separation-of-concern, by separating the fault-
tolerance implementations from the application-specific details. Thus, it reduces the 
application developer's burden. 
• Using the FT-PAS, the protocol developer can extend the fault-tolerance protocol 
base supported for a given skeleton by implementing new fault-tolerance strategies. 
• Unlike many existing systems, the FT-PAS is aimed at addressing concern related to 
delivering fault-tolerance support in a pattern-specific manner instead of having one 
common fault-tolerance strategy for all application types. 
6.3 Experimentation and Results 
We conducted experiments to measure the performance of the framework using the test 
environment described in Section 6.1. The results observed from various experiments are 
discussed in the following section. In general, the objectives of these experiments are to 
measure the framework overhead incurred due to fault-tolerance. This section is divided 
into two subsections. Each of these subsections discusses a different set of experiments 
for different objectives and interprets their results. 
In the first subsection, the objective is to measure the framework overhead with and 
without fault-tolerance. In the second subsection, the objective is to measure and compare 
the overhead incurred due to different fault-tolerance strategies. In all these experiments, 
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the FT-PAS framework components are configured to run in a single workstation, while 
the application modules run on the other workstations. 
6.3.1 Framework Overhead 
In the first set of experiments, the objective is to measure the overhead due to logging. 
Table 1 presents the test results observed from the experiment by varying a single 
parameter, i.e., number of communication events. 
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Table 1: Overhead incurred with and without the simple logging protocol 
In theory, the logging overhead is expected to increase linearly with the increase in the 
communication events (illustrated using dotted line in Figure 31). However, from the 
above experiment, we observe an exponential increase (Figure 31). This deviation might 
be due to the framework overhead (i.e. overhead incurred because of using a central data 
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Figure 31: Overhead due to logging 
In the second set of experiments, the objective is to measure the overhead due to the 
checkpointing (system-level). Table 2 illustrates the test results observed by varying the 



































Table 2: Overhead incurred with and without checkpointing 
In theory, the checkpoint overhead is expected to increase linearly with increase in the 
number of checkpoints (illustrated using dotted line in Figure 32). However, from the 
above experiment, we observe an exponential increase. This deviation might be due to 
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the framework overhead (i.e. overhead incurred because of using a central data store for 
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Figure 32: Overhead due to checkpointing 
6.3.1 Comparison of the Different Fault-Tolerance Protocols 
In this subsection, we discuss two sets of experiments in order to compare two different 
fault-tolerance protocols. In the first set of experiments, the objective is to compare the 
overhead incurred using the color-based checkpoint protocol (discussed in Section 3.2) 
and the blocking checkpoint protocol. First, we illustrate how the overhead changes in 
varying the message localization density. Message localization density is defined as the 
average message group density divided by the total inter-group messages; whereas, the 
message group density is defined as the number of intra-group messages divided by the 
group size. We fixed all parameters, such as the number of slaves per group, number of 
groups and total number of intra-group messages per group but varied the message 
localization density. The message localization density is varied by varying the number of 
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inter-group messages exchanged between two groups. Table 3 shows the overhead 
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Table 3: Fault tolerance overhead - varying message localization density 
The overhead decreased as the message localization density increased. This is from the 
fact that the more messages are localized within a group, the less become the inter-group 
messages. Thus, the overall overhead decreases as the logging overhead incurred from 
inter-group message decreases, which is observed from the graph (Figure 33). 
Figure 33: Fault tolerance overhead percent - varying message localization density 
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Also, we measured the overhead due to the blocked checkpoint protocol; its average 
overhead is computed as 20.2 sec. 
Figure 34: Overhead ratio - varying message localization density 
Figure 34 shows the overhead ratio of the blocked checkpoint protocol over the color-
based checkpoint protocol by varying the message localization density. The overhead 
ratio increases as the density increases. Thus we can interpret from the graph that the 
color-based checkpoints do comparatively better than the blocked checkpoint protocol for 
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Table 4: Overhead comparison - application-level and system-level checkpoint 
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In the final set of experiments, the objective is to compare the overhead incurred due to 
the system-level checkpoint protocol with the application-level checkpoint protocol for a 
problem of iterative type such as Jacobi. The overhead incurred using these two protocols 
is observed by varying the number of checkpoints (Table 4). 
Figure 35: Overhead comparison - application-level and system-level checkpoint 
The size of the state information that is saved at each checkpoint for the system-level 
checkpoint is significantly higher than that of the application-level checkpoint. Figure 35 
illustrates the increasing trend of the checkpoint overhead comparing the two checkpoint 
protocols. We can interpret that as the number of checkpoints increases, the percentage-
overhead increase due to the system-level checkpoint is higher compared to that of the 
application-level checkpoint. Thus, we can infer that the application-level checkpoint 
protocol do comparatively better than the system-level checkpoint protocol for the long 
running parallel applications. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion and Future Research 
In this thesis, we have classified patterns into sub-pattems based on the fault-tolerance 
strategies, which are identified based on pattern characteristics. We have presented a 
model to achieve application-specific fault-tolerance in parallel programming. 
The FT-PAS model is based on the PAS model. The FT-PAS addresses issues from a two 
user group perspective: the application developer and the protocol developer. The FT-
PAS provides patterns implementation along with their supported fault-tolerance 
strategies. This pre-packaged and pre-implemented solution delivers maximum possible 
separation-of-concern, i.e., to alleviate the application developer's burden due to the 
fault-tolerance implementation-specific issues. 
The protocol developer is responsible for extending existing skeletons with newer fault-
tolerance protocols based on need. Hence, the protocol developer is expected to be well 
experienced with systems-specific issues. The FT-PAS model contributes a set of core 
facilities to support the protocol extension. Thus, the protocol developer can use these 
core facilities to build new fault-tolerance strategies. From that perspective, the 
framework can also be regarded as a test-bed for evaluating newer fault-tolerance 
protocols. 
Future studies can possibly focus on some areas of enhancement and limitation of the 
current FT-PAS model, of which few are briefed here. Currently, we assume that the 
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internal-component of the FT-PAS model is failure-free. It is possible to overcome this 
limitation by making the internal components fault-tolerant. The centralized checkpoint 
dependency graph used in the FT-PAS model is another limitation which leads to total 
loss of data when the central resource fails. This limitation can be resolved by managing 
the checkpoint dependency graph in a distributed manner. 
Further extensions can be amended to the model in order to contribute more flexibility in 
terms of providing fault-tolerance. Further investigation is required in order to address 
other issues such as compose-ability and adaptability with respect to fault-tolerance. 
Compose-ability refers to addressing concerns in order to support fault-tolerance in 
skeleton composition [41]; whereas, adaptability refers to investigating the need for 
variable fault-tolerances in an application based on the run-time characteristics. 
Currently, the fault-tolerance provided for an application in other existing systems, 
including ours, is based on a single strategy (configured statically before compilation). 
Whereas, an application might require choosing and adapting its strategy, in such case it 
needs to be configured with more than one strategy. Thus, the strategy to use gets 
selected at runtime based on the application's runtime characteristics. 
In addition, the FT-PAS model can be extended to support Extensible PAS [41]. A 
graphical user interface can be amended to the FT-PAS model to ease the users' 
involvement related to application development and protocol development. All these are 
potentially candidates that lead us in an interesting direction for future research. 
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